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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE

by
Uchechukwu A. Jarrett
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Hamid Mohtadi

The title of this dissertation captures the intent of this study. It centers on aspects of international
trade and finance and their impact on growth and development. The effect of openness on the
financial crisis of 2008 which wreaked havoc worldwide on financial and non-financial systems
alike is examined. It is observed that the role of both financial and trade openness is not constant
throughout the crisis as was once thought. In addition, and contrary to popular belief, the effect
of trade openness dominated that of financial openness, suggesting that while a shortcoming in
the financial markets may have been to blame for the origin of the crisis, the negative
consequences were spread through trade channels. Due to the increase in risk during this time
period and the deleterious effects trade openness had on economies the world over, the role of
risk in trade flow determination is studied. It is determined that risk has a significant impact on
trade flow determination and as such, has a significant impact on growth rates across different
countries, with developing countries suffering more due to a higher level of risk than their
developed counterparts. This dissertation can thus be divided into two subsets. The first of these
subsets, which is entirely discussed in the first chapter, takes a unique look at the effect of
openness, both via trade and finance on an economy, paying particular attention to a period in
ii

time during great recession of 2008 where we know that the detriments of openness were felt the
world over. The second subset deals with factors that influence a country’s choice in trading
partners, specifically country specific risk. This is studied by introducing countries’ idiosyncratic
risk measures to the standard gravity model in order to determine what role risk plays in
determining trade partnerships. This aspect is addressed in the second chapter while the third
chapter examines the implication of this finding on growth rates. The implication of these factors
on the growth rate of the economy through this trade nexus is studied in order to provide a more
accurate estimate of the contribution of trade to growth rates and propose a reason for differences
in success rates of trade expansionary policies designed to promote growth, particularly in
developing countries.
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Chapter one
The Transmission of the Great Recession and the Role of Openness: A Counterfactual Diagnosis
1.1 Introduction
In early 2015, the volatility spike in stock exchanges across the globe and the corresponding
decline in commodity prices, a response to the specter of some contraction of the Chinese
economy, served to remind us once again how vulnerable the world economy could be to the
propagation of risk. Can we apply the lessons learned from the most recent financial collapse of
the global economy in 2008 to shed light on a likely propagation of new risk? Can we, for example,
identify the path and the nature of this propagation in the sense of determining how and which
potential countries would be most impacted, based on the type and extent of their relationship with
China?
In light of the above, much rides on the accuracy of the retrospective analyses of the 2008 financial
collapse. I therefore turn my attention to those analyses and find the literature wanting: As far as
I can tell, past studies of this subject have used the degree of decline in growth as a measure of the
impact of a crisis on an economy. A return to pre-crisis growth has then been assumed to indicate
a return to normalcy. This approach is limited in three ways; first a return to pre-crisis growth
rates may be a consequence of a depressed level of output as a result of the crisis and thus, far from
indicating that the impact of a financial crisis has dissipated. Second, a decline in growth might be
a natural part of the economy’s progression through its business cycle that would have occurred
even in the absence of a financial crisis. Thus, attributing this decline to the crisis can potentially
overestimate the impact of the crisis or underestimate its duration. Third, this traditional measure
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of impact does not capture the effects of the crisis on the other macroeconomic variables that are
also impacted by the crisis.
To address these deficiencies, I propose an alternative approach: First, I predict counterfactual
levels of output (and hence growth) for the post crisis era (post 2007) as if the financial crisis of
2008 never took place. The impact of the crisis in each country for each time period is then defined
as the difference between the predicted counterfactual GDP and the observed GDP. This new
approach enables us to study the role of the suspected factors in influencing the impact of the crisis
on output and on growth. Put succinctly, I empirically investigate the potential for evolving roles
of trade and financial openness from the onset of the financial crisis, using a more accurate measure
of the impact of the financial crisis on output level and growth. This will allow us to identify its
effects on the economies studied, and as such, highlight policy implications in the advent of
another recession.
The effects of the financial crisis in the late 2000s were profound and far reaching. Among
scholars, they generated much interest in the study of crises, from the factors that cause financial
collapse, to methods of prediction, to pathways of contagion. In this paper, the focus is primarily
on the pathways of contagion. Financial crises can be attributed to the presence of systemic risk,
stemming from an external shock that affects markets that co-move or, a failure of a particular
system that spreads akin to a disease, infecting other systems to which it is connected. While
studying an external shock can be managed by identifying causal factors that could lead to system
failures, contagion can only be studied by examining the pathways through which systems are
connected. The analogy between the spread of systemic risk and a disease is apt as much of the
blame for the propagation of systemic risk has fallen on the type and extent of the relationship
between market systems, specifically openness. Proponents of openness argue that it is a vital tool
2

in the mitigation of idiosyncratic risk and as such, push for policies that promote openness. Critics
of openness, on the other hand, view it as the channel through which a crisis is spread and advocate
for policies against it.
Given the fact that the 2008 financial crisis began with the bursting of the housing market bubble
in the US and spread to other markets within and outside the US via housing related derivatives
(e.g., MBS), financial openness has been identified as the culprit for the spread of the “disease” to
other parts of the world. While a complete return to autarky may have protected countries against
these adverse effects, such a strategy would not have aided in mitigating idiosyncratic risks during
periods of regular economic activity. Does this then imply that countries should take up a position
at the other end of the spectrum and become completely open? Either extreme is unlikely to be
the answer. This then prompts the question: just how open is too open? This question may be quite
difficult to answer categorically and is likely to depend both on the “state” of the economy and the
“pathways” of contagion. In this paper, I study the pathways of contagion themselves and as with
any other disease, will try to identify (a) how the “disease” is transmitted and (b) how the pathways
of contagion contribute to the impact of the crisis on the host. With openness as the prime suspect,
I look at the two variants of openness that may be associated with the propagation of a crisis: trade
openness and financial openness.
In contrast to previous studies, my approach allows us to ask, among other things, whether the role
of openness in the financial crisis was an “asymmetric” one, i.e. whether over time openness was
transmuted from a “vector” contributed to the transmission of the crisis to a “remedy” that
mitigated the negative effect of the crisis. Establishing this result would suggest policies that
change over shorter periods of time during the crisis to take advantage of this asymmetry, instead
of static policies implemented throughout the duration of the crisis, consequently slowing down
3

the return to normalcy. It would also help to determine what type of openness – trade or financehas more of an impact as a vector and a remedy. Answering this question also has critical policy
implications. For, it tells us whether countries must opt to become more (less) open via trade or
finance in times of crises when becoming more (less) open is deemed viable. This study can thus
provide invaluable insights towards developing efficient policies to account for openness in both
the presence and absence of crises, bringing us one step closer to answering that ever illusive
question of how open is too open. The brief summary of the literature which follows is by no
means exhaustive, but serves first to point out the different views on the effects of the different
kinds of openness on an economy; second, to show the need for the consideration of both types of
openness in the analysis; and third, to highlight the gap in the literature and thus the contribution
of this paper.
Stiglitz (1999) highlighted the dangers of premature financial market liberalization, pointing out
that financial openness, while appropriate for economies with strong regulatory structures may
harm those without such institutions, leading to risky lending behavior by banks faced with a
sudden influx of capital. Examining the Asian financial crisis of the late 90s in this light, Stiglitz
casts doubt on the efficacy of financial liberalization favoring trade openness instead. Hamdi and
Jlassi (2014) studied 58 developing economies between 1984 and 2007 to determine whether
financial liberalization led to any of the banking crises that occurred within that time period. Using
a panel logit estimation procedure, they find no relationship between financial openness and
crises.1

1

The authors did show however that foreign debt liabilities and foreign direct investment liabilities increased the
likelihood of a banking crisis.
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Cavallo and Frankel (2008) used annual data for all countries listed on the IMF financial statistics
database between 1970 and 2002 to find that trade openness reduces the impact of a crisis,
suggesting a restorative role of trade openness during a crisis. A contradictory view was suggested
by Classens et. al. (2010), who used a cross sectional dataset from 58 countries to study the impact
of certain factors on the depth and the duration of the 2008 financial crises and found that an
increase in trade openness led to increase both the duration and the severity of the financial crisis
across countries. Classens et. al. (2012) presented further confirmation of this view by using
accounting data from non-financial firms in 42 countries between 2007 and 2009 to show that the
crisis had a larger negative impact on firms in countries that are more open to trade while financial
openness had little to no contribution.
Ranciere et. al. (2006) addressed the question of the dual nature of financial openness by
disaggregating the contribution of financial openness to growth and to the occurrence of financial
crises. Using a panel dataset of 60 countries between 1980 and 2002, they find that the direct effect
of financial openness on growth is much greater than a potential adverse indirect effect that might
lead to a financial crisis. In other words, the authors suggest that the benefits of financial openness
far outweigh the costs, corroborating the conclusions of Schmukler (2004) whose literature review
on various studies on the benefits and risks of financial globalization, point to the conclusion that
the net effect of financial openness is likely to be positive in the long run. Finally, Ozkan and Unsal
(2012) contribute theoretically to the literature on systemic risk contagion. They develop a two
country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to investigate the contagion effects of
systemic risk, taking both trade and financial linkages into account, particularly mimicking the
events of the 2008 crisis which showed a transfer from developed to developing economies. They
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find that the lower the level of openness (both financial and trade), the lower the impact of the
crisis.
It is by now evident that the existing literature yields conflicting results on the relationship between
the effect of openness in a crisis, depending on the time frame, the measure chosen, the approach
taken, and the countries studied. Besides these sources of variation, however, these studies share
several common substantive shortcomings that I address presently.
One issue is using the drop in growth rate as a measure for the impact of a crisis, and assuming
that this drop is entirely due to the crisis. This ignores the business cycle effects.2 The second issue
is the implicit assumption that financial crisis does not have a lasting effect on the level of output.
In the case of the Great Recession for example, most studies assume that the effects of the crisis
ended a short time afterwards. However, if it should turn out that financial crisis altered the overall
trend of output, it would follow that a much longer return time to the pre-crisis path may be needed.
The third issue is that a return to pre-crisis growth rates may be the result of depressed output,
brought on by the financial crisis. This would overstate the growth rate, given that the base output
is lower. In this case, a return to pre-crisis growth rates do not necessarily imply a return to the
pre-crisis state (output level).
I address these shortcomings by predicting counterfactual levels of output (and growth) for the
post crisis era (2008 to 2013) from pre-crisis data as if the financial crisis of 2008 never took place.
The impact of the crisis in each country for each time period is then measured by the difference

2

To illustrate how this leads to a bias in measuring the role of trade in the transmission of crisis, consider an open
agrarian economy with peak harvest periods of higher than average output and the exporting of the excess, and a
planting season with a dip in output and thus of importing the shortage. Associating this regular decline in output to
the crisis will (a) overestimate the impact of the crisis and (b) provide false evidence of a relationship between the
crisis and trade.
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between the predicted counterfactual output and the observed output. This enables us study the
impact of openness on the effect of the crisis alone, without the inclusion of regular cyclical
declines in output. In this way, I am able to extract the potential dynamic relationship between
openness and the impact of the financial crisis on growth and output separately over time, instead
of lumping them together.
These modifications highlight my main contribution. As far as I know, the drop in output and in
growth rate have not been disentangled in studying the overall effect of the crisis, and the effect of
the financial crisis on output has not been studied previously. The closest studies to mine
nonetheless differ from mine in several significant ways. For example, a study by Furceri and
Mourougane (2012) that considers the effects of financial crises in OECD countries between 1960
and 2008 focus on potential output estimates whereas I focus on observed output. A study by
Berkmen et. al. (2009) that also examines the impact of the 2008 financial crisis focuses on growth
rate, not on output level, but even then it uses growth forecast revisions by field experts in a static
cross country context, rather than in a dynamic setting. Finally, a study by Gupta et al. (2007) that
measures the effect of currency crises in developing countries between 1970 and 2000 bears some
resemblance to mine but also differs from mine in one fundamental respect. Gupta et al. estimate
a trend and then measure the annual deviation from that trend to capture the cycle. They then use
the change in this measure at times of currency crises as an indication of the effect of the currency
crisis. Here, the key difference with my methodology is that by estimating a counterfactual in
projecting estimated output and growth, my approach allows for the possibility of changes in the
trend itself while theirs does not.
What remains is organized as follows; section 2 discusses the data and estimation procedures used
for both the prediction of the counterfactual output, as well as the analysis of the relationship
7

between openness and the crisis. Section 3 discusses the estimation results and robustness checks.
Section 4 concludes.
1.2.

Data and Estimation Procedures

1.2.1 Data
As with most empirical studies, the problem of data availability is present in this analysis. To
overcome this problem, I use two datasets: Annual and quarterly. Each has its own advantage; the
quarterly data yields fewer countries but more time entries (large N and large T setup); the annual
data yields more countries and less time entries (Large N and small T setup). Both datasets are
analyzed using different procedures designed to handle the varying country and time sizes. The
annual dataset consists of 50 countries between 2008 and 2013, and the quarterly dataset consists
of 30 countries between the first quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 20133. Output is
measured by real gross domestic product and growth is measured by the change in output between
any two time periods.
1.2.1.1 Measure of financial openness
There are two main measures of financial openness used in this paper; a de-facto measure which
captures the actual flow of financial capital across countries, and a de-jure measure which
measures the restrictions placed on capital mobility across countries. The de-facto measure is
obtained by aggregating a country’s total international investment position, which is a sum of its
external assets and liabilities4 as a fraction of its GDP, in line with the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti (2001)
definition. This implies that quarterly, as well as annual observations of this measure of financial

3
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A full list of the data used as well as their sources can be found in table A.2 of Appendix 1.
Assets and liabilities used here are sums of both direct investment and portfolio investment

8

openness can be obtained. The de-jure measure is one developed by Chinn and Ito (2006).
However, this measure is only an annual measure and has no quarterly equivalent. Figure 1 below
summarizes the average de-facto financial openness measures for the 50 countries used in this
analysis.
Figure 1: Average financial openness over time

1.2.1.2 Measure of Trade openness
The measure of trade openness used in this paper is the sum of exports and imports as a fraction
of GDP, which allows for a quarterly and an annual measure. As with all measures of trade
openness, there are potential issues with this measure, primarily the fact that this measure only
captures a country’s level of integration in international markets and not its trade policies that
might hold more information about its attitude towards openness. An example of this might be a
country that has limited resources and has no choice but to engage in importation to sustain itself.
This country would appear open to trade using this measure, but might have very strict export
restrictions that might make its measure of openness lower using other trade measures. An ideal
alternative measure for trade openness would be the tariffs placed on goods in each country. The
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problem with this is that these tariff measures depend on what each country can produce and the
preferences of its constituents. As a result, it provides no real comparison across countries and fails
to measure the extent of a country’s integration in the international market, but provides
information on trade policies (regarding certain goods). Ultimately the measure of trade openness
used here is because of its availability, its measure of the level of integration and for easier
comparison to other works in the literature. Figure two below captures the average measure of
Trade openness for the 50 countries used in this study.
Figure 2: Average trade openness over time

In the following sub-sections, I examine the estimation procedures that will be applied to both data
sets. First, I discuss the procedure used in estimating the effect of the crisis on both the growth rate
and the output level. Next, I discuss the Arellano Bond GMM approach to estimating the annual
dataset, and finally, the application of the pooled mean group estimate (PMG) to the quarterly
dataset.
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1.2.2 Measuring the impact of the crisis
I estimate the counterfactual GDP for a different panel of countries for both the annual and
quarterly datasets in order to take advantage of the differing measures of openness available at the
annual level, and the increase in the number of time parameters at the quarterly level thereby
getting a better fit for each dataset. Using pre crisis data5, I fit an Auto regressive (AR) model to
GDP and then forecast post crisis GDP using 2007 observed data and the same estimated AR
specification. The Schwarz information criterion (SIC) is used in selecting the appropriate AR
model6. This way, the pre-crisis pattern is not broken due to the financial crisis thus generating
counterfactual estimates. However, these estimates are subject to prediction errors, which I
subsequently correct for, i.e.

Y Ai ,t  Y Pi ,t   Pi ,t for pre-crisis data where,

(1)

Where, Y Ai ,t is the observed pre crisis GDP for country i at time t; t = 1980 to 2007 for annual data
and 1996 second quarter to 2007 fourth quarter for quarterly data; Y P i ,t is the predicted GDP value
for country i at time t using the determined pre-crisis AR process as described above;  P i ,t is the
prediction error for country i at time t in the pre-crisis period. In order to generate a more accurate
value for the predicted GDP for the crisis period, I first generate an average prediction error for
each country from the pre-crisis period,

1 T P
 i ,t   P i for each country i,

T t 1

5
6

(2)

1980 to 2007 for annual dataset and second quarter in 1996 to fourth quarter in 2007 for the quarterly dataset
usually the one with the smallest SIC value
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and then augment the initial counterfactual estimates with this estimated prediction errors. I simply
add the estimate of each country’s prediction error  pi to the initial forecasts Y if i , s , i.e.

Y ff i , s  Y if i ,s   p i

(3)

where, Y ff i , s is the final forecast value of post crisis GDP, and s = 2007 to 2013 for both annual
and quarterly data; Y if i , s is the initial forecast value of post crisis GDP from the pre-crisis AR
process
These predicted values capture an approximate pattern of the pre-crisis GDP, including the trend
and cycle behavior, the same pattern that would exist in the post-crisis GDP pattern. This is in
opposition to a trend-cycle decomposition which does not allow for a deviation from a trend in the
post crisis period due to the impact of the crisis. This makes taking the difference between the
post crisis estimates and the observed post-crisis values a more accurate measure of the impact of
the crisis. As such, the impact of the crisis for observations after the crisis is given as;

DLeveli ,t  Y ff i ,t  Yi ,At (for GDP level) and

(4)

DGrowthi ,t  Y ff i ,t  Yi ,At (for GDP growth) where  indicates first difference

(5)

DLeveli ,t is the difference between the predicted and observed level of GDP for country i at time

t (measure of the impact on output)
DGrowthi ,t is the difference in the predicted and observed growth rate of GDP for country i at
time t (measure of the impact on growth)
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1.2.2.1 Robustness checks for the measures of the impact of the financial crisis
1.2.2.1.1

Testing the significance of the measure

Now that I have established the AR specification and estimated the counterfactuals for the postcrisis period, I determine their signs and test that they are significantly different from zero. Since
the output level and growth rates fell below the norm during the crisis, one would expect positive
and statistically significant measures of Dlevel and DGrowth 7. Figures 3 through 6 below depict
the average of the estimated variables Dlevel and DGrowth for all countries in this study over
time for both the quarterly and annual datasets, i.e. I define the average of the measures Dlevel
and DGrowth as it such that

1t 

1 N1
 Dlevelkt , for t from 2008 to 2013, and N1 = 50
N1 k 1

1 N1
2t   DGrowthkt , for t from 2009 to 2013, and N1 = 50
N1 k 1
1 N2
3t 
 Dlevelkt , for t from first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2013, and N 2 = 30
N2 k 1

4t 

1 N2
 DGrowthkt , for t from second quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2013, and N 2 = 30
N 2 k 1

Figures 3 through 6 suggest that on average, countries have not returned to their pre-crisis paths
of output8, but have returned to, and may have even surpassed their pre-crisis growth rates9. Since

Since they are defined as Counterfactual – Observed, where counterfactual is the estimate of the norm
Positive measure of average Dlevel
9
Negative measure of average DGrowth
7
8
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output levels dropped, this accelerated growth is expected in order for countries to return to their
pre-crisis paths of output. Next, I determine the statistical significance of these estimates. To do
this, I simply test the following hypotheses:
H 0 : 1t  0; H A : 1t  0 for t : 2008 to 2013
H 0 : 2t  0; H A : 2t  0 for t : 2009 to 2013
H 0 : 3t  0; H A : 3t  0 for t : Q1 of 2008 to Q4 of 2013
H 0 : 4t  0; H A : 4t  0 for t : Q2 of 2008 to Q4 of 2013
Figure 3: Average Dlevel for Annual data

Figure 4: Average DGrowth for Annual data
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Figure 5: Average Dlevel for quarterly data
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Figure 6: Average DGrowth for quarterly data
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The results of the tests above are summarized in tables 1 and 2 below for Annual and quarterly
data respectively.
Table 1: Significance tests of means for Annual dataset
year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Average of

Dlevel  1t

0.0125781***
0.0639665***
0.0499264***
0.0439431**
0.0475517*
0.0450365

Average of

DGrowth   2t

0.0513885***
-0.0140402*
-0.0059833
0.0036086
-0.0025152

Table 1 above shows that on average, the Dlevel measure is significantly different from zero from
2008 to 2012, but not significantly different from zero in 2013. This coupled with the declining
level of certainty levels for which the alternative hypothesis is preferred over the null, suggests
that countries are indeed returning to their pre-crisis paths and may have finally done so in 2013.
Table 2: Significance tests of means for Quarterly data
Quarter

Average of

Dlevel  3t

Average of

DGrowth   4t

0.0072898**
2008Q1
0.0161735***
0.0088837***
2008Q2
0.0284461***
0.0122726***
2008Q3
0.0591307***
0.0306846***
2008Q4
0.0946953***
0.0355646***
2009Q1
0.1010901***
0.0063948*
2009Q2
0.1030475***
0.0019575
2009Q3
0.1061131***
0.0030655**
2009Q4
0.1103523***
0.0042393*
2010Q1
0.1075974***
-0.002755
2010Q2
0.1124677***
0.0048703**
2010Q3
0.1136581***
0.0011903
2010Q4
0.1176826***
0.0040246*
2011Q1
0.1237616***
0.0060789***
2011Q2
0.1297985***
0.0060369***
2011Q3
0.1377528***
0.0079543***
2011Q4
0.1478687***
0.0101159***
2012Q1
0.1575301***
0.0096613***
2012Q2
0.1652186***
0.0076885***
2012Q3
0.1756748***
0.0104562***
2012Q4
0.1833594***
0.0076846***
2013Q1
0.1897645***
0.0064052***
2013Q2
0.1939742***
0.0042097*
2013Q3
0.1994969***
0.0055227***
2013Q4
For tables 2 and 3, *,**, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. t tests
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This implies that the financial crisis of 2008 lasted, at least in this group of countries till 2012
which I will abide by during my analysis of the annual dataset. The average DGrowth measure
from Table 1 which is significant only in 2009 and 2010 suggests that this group of countries on
average returned to their pre-crisis path of growth much quicker than output, implying that the
financial crisis lasted till 2010, which is the general view adopted by others in the literature. Table
2 above shows stronger significance of both the Dlevel and DGrowth measures than the findings
in Table 1, which suggests that on average, these countries are still yet to return to their quarterly
pre-crisis paths of both output and growth, as both average measures are positive10 and statistically
significant. Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence that the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 lasted
beyond 2010 for these countries under investigation, at least where the level of output is concerned.

1.2.2.1.2

Why trust these counterfactuals estimates?

The claim that these measures better capture the impact of the financial crisis on output and growth
depends on how well the AR specification estimated for the progression of Output (and therefore
growth) fits the observed data. An alternate approach would have been to use output and growth
forecasts by recognized economic research institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) as post crisis counterfactual measures. The IMF in a particular year uses the observed
growth rates for the two preceding years to predict the growth rates for each country over the next
six years11. My claim is that my “in-sample” estimation yields a closer match to the actual
progression of GDP than the IMF’s out of sample forecasts. In essence, I cheat and in fact, suggest
that cheating in this case gives rise to more accurate counterfactuals necessary for my analysis. To

10

Recall that, a positive measure of
the observed.
11
Theirs is also an AR(2) Model

Dlevel or DGrowth
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implies that the counterfactual estimate is greater than

examine the potential accuracy of my “retrospective” counterfactual, I determine how well my AR
specification performs by comparing the forecasts of the IMF to my predicted estimates of annual12
pre-crisis growth and the observed pre-crisis data. Since at the time of forecasting, the IMF had
less information than I do now, I expect that my estimates – as they are obtained using in-sample
observations – would better match the observed growth data than the IMF’s Forecasts. It is useful
to think of the IMF forecasts as the absolute lower bound that my model has to at least match to
be useful in this analysis and the observed data as the absolute upper bound. As a result, I first
compare estimates of growth rates for the following years: 1990 – 1995, 1995 – 2000, 2000 – 2005
to the observed data, and second, compare my estimates to those of the IMF. Figures 7, 8 and 9
below show the average predictions and observed growth rates for the three time periods examined.
Figure 7: 1990 – 1995 predictions

12

Figure 8: 1995 – 2000 predictions

The IMF does not provide quarterly forecasts so we are limited to comparing just the annual estimates
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Figure 9: 2000 – 2005 predictions

From the figures above, it appears that my estimates mimic the behavior of the observed growth
rates better than the IMF forecasts, but to see if the difference is statistically significant, I test the
correlation of the predictive models with the observed data and with each other, in order to
determine which model does a better job of matching observed growth rates. If giest,t is my growth
obs
rate prediction, g iimf
,t is the IMF predicted growth rate and g i ,t is the observed growth rate, for

country i at time t , the following table summarizes the accuracy of both models when predicting
observed annual growth rates. A positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient closer
to one (the 45-degree equality line) when compared with the observed growth rates will indicate a
higher level of accuracy of the model while a negative or statistically insignificant correlation
coefficient indicates poor performance.
From columns 2 and 3 of table 3, my model is positive and statistically significant (PSS) 13 out of
the 18 years examined, while the IMF forecasts are PSS only 11 out of the 18 years forecasted. Of
the 13 years my model is PSS, 10 of them show a higher correlation coefficient with the observed
data than the IMF forecasts. Column 4 highlights the correlation between my forecasts and those
of the IMF. This column indicates that about 50% of the time, my forecasts and those of the IMF
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are correlated, all be it when both are more correlated with the observed data. These results suggest
that my “in-sample” estimates on average do better at matching the observed pre-crisis data than
the IMF’s out of sample forecasts as expected and as suggested by figures 3 through 5.
Table 3: Predictive model analysis
Year

Corr ( g EST , g OBS )

Corr ( g IMF , g OBS )

Corr ( g EST , g IMF )

0.6941*
0.7765*
0.6531*
1990
0.5887*
0.4907*
0.3614*
1991
0.6265*
0.4681*
0.4282*
1992
0.4894*
0.3920*
0.4153
1993
0.197
0.2979
0.3554*
1994
0.3888*
0.5459*
0.1648
1995
0.5537*
0.5741*
0.4354*
1995
0.3306*
0.2571
0.2721
1996
0.5891*
-0.01
0.0463
1997
0.3681*
-0.4486*
-0.0854
1998
0.2820
-0.0371
-0.4691*
1999
0.278
0.2383
-0.0403
2000
0.5222*
0.5148*
0.7242*
2000
-0.237
0.0395
0.1752
2001
0.2107
0.6404*
0.0808
2002
0.6183*
0.5022*
0.574*
2003
0.5770*
0.5295*
0.4495*
2004
0.5512*
0.5051*
0.4598*
2005
* here represents a statistically significant correlation coefficient at the 95% level confidence interval

N
41
41
41
41
41
41
46
46
46
46
46
46
47
47
47
47
47
47

In addition, the fact that the AR specification employed by the IMF in predicting these growth
rates is not readily available, therefore making post-crisis counterfactual estimation that much
harder, makes my estimates the better choice for this analysis.
1.2.2.1.3

Why trust these as measures of the impact of a crisis?

Before this new measure is ratified as an improvement over the traditional measure, one
question still remains: How certain is it that this deviation from the norm is due to the financial
crisis of 2008 and not some random effect that is a result of left over prediction errors? In order to
provide an answer to this question, I carry out a “falsification” test by assuming (erroneously, of
course) that there was a financial crisis in 2003. I therefore follow the same process and estimate
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counterfactuals for the post 2003 periods and compare my estimates to the observed data. If this
procedure is truly representative of the impact of the crisis, I would expect to capture the “boom”
that existed before the “bust” in 2008. This should manifest as higher observed output levels than
the estimated counterfactuals, leading to negative estimates of Dlevel . Figure 10 below shows
both the counterfactual estimates and the observed data under this erroneous assumption. I can
clearly observe that the counterfactual estimates are consistently lower up till 2007, depicting
evidence of the price boom.
Figure 10: Falsification tests

Lastly, I show that this difference between the counterfactuals and the observed data is negative
and statistically significant.
Table 4: Significance of falsification tests
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Average
Counterfactual
25.52304
25.55187
25.5802
25.60799
25.63522

Average
Observed
25.53312
25.58544
25.63136
25.68331
25.73839
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Average (Counterfactual –
Observed)
-0.0100758***
-0.0335672***
-0.0511539***
-0.0753218***
-0.1031708***

N
50
50
50
50
50

Table 4 above captures the tests of the differences between counterfactual and observed data across
time and it can be observed that all differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. When
I consider the fact that starting in 2008 the signs are positive and significant, it suffices to say that
this measure indeed captures the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the countries studied.
1.2.3 Annual Data Estimation Procedure
The following two regression equations are individually estimated for the annual panel dataset to
capture the effect of both types of openness on the impact of a financial crisis, using both the level
and the growth rate of GDP:
DLeveli ,t  1i  1TOi ,t  2 FOi ,t   i ,t

(6)

DGrowthi ,t  2i  3TOi ,t  4 FOi ,t   i ,t

(7)

Where,

1i &  2i are the individual country specific fixed effects of country i with respect to GDP and
growth respectively

TOi ,t is the measure of trade openness for country i at time t and
FOi ,t is the measure of financial openness for country i at time t
To eliminate the country fixed effects, the first difference of each equation is taken and given as
DLeveli ,t  1TOi ,t  2 FOi ,t  1i ,t

(8)

DGrowthi ,t  3TOi ,t  4FOi ,t   2i ,t

(9)
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The problem with estimating these equations as they are is that there is a potential for the violation
of the orthogonality condition, i.e. Cov  TOi ,t ,  i ,t   0 and Cov  FOi ,t ,  i ,t   0 . This
potential violation is due to the fact that a change in openness could cause a change in the error
terms 1i ,t &  2i ,t , implying a correlation between the independent variable and the error term.
Drawing again on the earlier agrarian economy example, a change in openness could result in the
acquisition of sophisticated farming equipment that could lead to a boost in output and growth.
This could in turn, close the gap between predicted and actual GDP much quicker, implying that
there is a correlation between the change in openness and the change in the shock to GDP. To
address this issue, I use the Arellano and Bond general method of moments (GMM) estimation
procedure. It makes use of an instrument variable zi ,t , which consists of t-1 lags of the regressors
such that Cov  zi ,t ,  i ,t  = 0. This provides better estimates of  i ' s and avoids the problem of weak
instruments. In this paper, I use the first lag of financial openness and trade openness only as
instruments, as there is no weak instrument problem by definition. This also enables us utilize as
much of the dataset as possible. I allow for heteroscedasticity across countries by using the
weighting matrix suggested by Arellano and Bond. A positive and statistically significant
coefficient on either openness measure would mean an increase in openness, increases DLeveli ,t
(or DGrowthi ,t ), which implies a larger impact on the economy for both output level and growth,
hence, a PSS coefficient implies a deleterious effect of openness on the economy, and a negative
coefficient implies a positive contribution.
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1.2.4

Quarterly data estimation

With the increased number of time observations in the quarterly dataset and the decrease in the
interval between each observation when compared to the annual dataset, a different approach is
called for to better examine the relationship between the deviation from the predicted values and
the openness measures. I consider an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification, which
is more suitable because, given the smaller interval between observations in this dataset; lags of
both the dependent and independent variables might affect the present level of deviation. I simplify
the analysis by once again considering just the first lag of both dependent and independent
variables. I justify this with the fact that the data on GDP of the economies studied in this paper
follow an AR (1) process13, which implies that the ARDL specification should contain at most one
lag of the dependent variable. This also provides an extra advantage that enables us to utilize as
much of the data in the sample as possible with the loss of only one “time” observation. As a result,
I estimate the following equation:

DLeveli ,t  1i  1i DLeveli ,t 1  10iTOi ,t  11iTOi ,t 1   20i FOi ,t   21i FOi ,t 1  1i ,t

10

DGrowthi ,t  2i  2i DGrowthi ,t 1   '10i TOi ,t   '11i TOi ,t 1   '20i FOi ,t   '21i FOi ,t 1   2i ,t 11
These yield the error correction re-parameterization estimation equations written as
DLeveli ,t  1i  DLeveli ,t 1  0i  1iTOi ,t  2i FOi ,t   11i TOi ,t   21i FOi ,t  1i ,t

12

DGrowthi ,t  2i  DGrowthi ,t 1  0i  1iTOi ,t  2i FOi ,t    11i TOi ,t   21i FOi ,t   2i ,t

13

13

See table A.3 in Appendix 1
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Where 1i   1  1i  ; 0i 

1i 

1i
 
   21i

2i   1  2i  ; 0i  2i ;
; 1i  10i 11i ;  2i  20i
1  1i
1  1i
1  1i
1  2i

 '10i   '11i
 '   '21i
and 2i  20i
1  2i
1  2i

1i & 2i are the error correction speed of adjustment parameters that signify a return to some
equilibrium level (0 in this case). 1i and  2i are the long run coefficients of trade and financial
openness respectively for deviation from output level and 11i and  21i are the short run coefficients
of trade and financial openness respectively, for deviation from output level. 1i and  2i are long
run coefficients of trade and financial openness and  11i and  21i are short run coefficients of trade
and financial openness respectively for deviation from growth. If 1i and 2i are insignificant, it
implies no adjustment on the part of the dependent variable with respect to changes in the
independent variables, meaning no effect of openness on the deviations from output level and
growth due to the financial crisis. The pooled mean group estimation procedure proposed by
Pesaran, Shinn and Smith (1999) is used to estimate equations 12 and 13 above. The pooled mean
group estimator allows for variability in the short term behavior in each country but assumes long
run similarities. This is better suited to my needs as I accept the fact that countries are
heterogeneous, but assume that all countries in the sample should eventually return to their precrisis paths of output and growth. The heterogeneity across countries is taken care off in the
estimation of the constant terms  0i and 0i as they represent estimates of country fixed effects for

Dlevel and DGrowth respectively. This PMG estimation method adds an extra dimensionality to
my study. It is possible to observe the short run and long run effects of openness on the impact of
a financial crisis to determine if there is a change in effect as time progresses.
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1.3.

Results

1.3.1 Annual data
For this dataset, I estimate the pre-crisis AR model using all 50 countries between 1980 and 2007.
This process is used in the counterfactual estimation of GDP for 2008 to 201214. Table A.3 in
appendix 1 shows that the best fit for this dataset is an AR (2) process. Table 5 below summarizes
the result of the regression estimates for equations 8 and 9. From table 5 below, an increase in
trade openness reduces the DLevel and DGrowth measures, implying a positive impact of trade
openness during the financial crisis. The de-facto financial measure of openness however, has a
positive effect on growth and a negative impact on output during the financial crisis, while the dejure measure has a positive impact on output but no effect on growth. This difference might be due
to the fact that the de-jure measure captures the willingness of countries to allow foreign
investments within their borders, while the de-facto measure is an overall measure of existing
levels of integration (both within and outside their borders). I also account for possible policies
which may change over time and might have an impact on a country’s ability to overcome the
negative effects of the financial crisis. I do this by introducing time fixed effects to capture both
observed and unobserved factors that are specific to different time periods, which could have
influenced the return to pre-crisis paths of output and growth. It stands to reason that changes in
these policies over time are not consistent across economies and as such, I address this by assuming
heteroscedasticity in the error term. The inclusion of time fixed effects (TFE) in the analysis do
not alter the earlier findings, suggesting that the effect of trade openness and both measures of
financial openness on the impact of the financial crisis is robust to these changing policies.

14

We stop at 2012 as the annual data suggests that countries on average have converged to the pre-crisis output path
by 2013, and as such is not included in the analysis
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Table 5: Trade and Financial openness and the Economic Crisis: Annual data

TO
FO
FOC
TFE

DLEVEL
2
3
-0.13***
-0.12***
0.016***
-0.11***
YES
NO

1
-0.10***
0.03***
NO

4
-0.14***

5
-0.37***
-0.07***

-0.08**
YES

NO

DGROWTH
6
7
-0.09**
-0.42***
-0.04***
0.02
YES
NO

8
-0.09**
0.07
YES

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating equations 8 and 9, using Arellano-Bond GMM estimation procedure
TO is trade openness, FO is de-facto measure of financial openness, FOC is the Chinn-Ito de-jure measure of
financial openness and TFE signifies the inclusion of time fixed effects.

3.2

Quarterly data

For this dataset which consists of 30 countries with time periods between the first quarter of 2008
and the fourth quarter of 2013, I once again fit an AR model to the progression of GDP using data
from the same set of countries between the second quarter of 1996 and the fourth quarter of 2007.
Table A.3 of appendix 1 shows that this dataset is best described by an AR (1) process. Table 6
below summarizes the findings from the analysis of the quarterly data set.
Table 6: Trade and Financial openness and the Economic Crisis: Quarterly data
Variable

DLEVEL
-0.095***
-0-091***

DGROWTH
-0.817***
-0.813***

TO
FO

0.057
-0.0004***
0.017***

0.013
-0.00004

0.0495**
-0.00002

0.004***

0.00066



0
0
TO
FO

0.141
-0.0004***
0.015***

-0.464***
-0.469***
-0.495***
-0.499***
-0.008
-0.008
-0.0095
-0.0092
NO
YES
NO
YES
TFE
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating equations 12 and 13 using Pesaran et. al. Pooled mean group (PMG) estimation procedure
TO is trade openness, FO is de-facto measure of financial openness,  is the speed of convergence,  0 and 0 are
the estimated country fixed effects for DLevel and DGrowth respectively and TFE signifies the inclusion of time
fixed effects
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The results show convergence to the pre-crisis path, with evidence of trade openness in the short
run encouraging a return to the pre-crisis path of output and growth. There is no initial long run
trade openness effect on convergence to the pre-crisis path of growth, but an inclusion of time
fixed effects reveals a negative impact of trade openness. This could be due to some unobserved
factor working to nullify the negative effects of trade openness on growth, but when the time fixed
effects are introduced, which accounts for this unobserved factor, the true relationship between
trade openness and the impact of the crisis on growth is revealed. The results from table 6 above
also indicate a robust positive long run effect of financial openness on a return to pre-crisis output
path, and no short run relationship. There is however, no short or long run effect of financial
openness on the growth rate. These results seem to suggest that post-crisis production was
stimulated by both trade and financial openness while growth was primarily stimulated by trade
alone and only in the short run, but is harmed by trade in the long run. The significance of the
constant terms supports the assumption made earlier that there is a difference across countries,
which accounts for country specific characteristics that influence the long run relationship between
the deviation from the pre-crisis paths of both growth and output and the levels of openness. I can
find evidence of the dual role of trade openness in the table above which puts the differing results
in the literature into perspective, but more on this later. To provide a basis for comparison across
the two datasets: annual and quarterly, the countries common to both datasets are obtained and
regressions using the respective estimation procedure is carried out for both reduced datasets. The
results of these regressions are shown in Table 7 below. The same pattern is observed in both these
datasets suggesting a uniformity in the findings.
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Table 7: Comparison across Annual and Quarterly datasets
Annual
TO
FO
TFE
Countries

DLEVEL
-0.17***
0.02
yes
23

DGROWTH
0.01***
-0.017***
yes
23

Quarterly
DLEVEL
DGROWTH
-0.54***
0.07***
-0.001
-0.0013*
yes
yes
23
23

1.3.3 Robustness Checks
Taking a cue from previous works that have studied the differences in impact of financial crises
across different countries, tables 8-13 establish the robustness of my results by introducing the
following variables known to have influenced the degree of the impact of financial crises.
1.3.3.1

Bank Lending rates: I expect that the lower the lending rates during a crisis, the

more loans can be granted and ultimately, the higher the levels of both output and growth which
implies lower Dlevel and DGrowth measures. This suggests that a positive coefficient is expected
when lending rates are introduced to the analysis. Tables 8 - 11 show a consistently positive and
strongly significant coefficient verifying my assumption. I find that trade openness is robust to the
inclusion of this measure for both output and growth. I also find that the de-jure measure of
financial openness is robust when considering output levels and consistently insignificant when
considering growth, while the de-facto measure is robust for growth but not robust for output15.
1.3.3.2 Net Reserves: Berkmen et. al (2009) find evidence that the higher the international
reserves an economy possesses, the smaller the effect of the financial crisis. I would therefore
expect that countries with higher net reserves would be affected less, which would suggest a

15

The reduction in the number of countries for the quarterly dataset due to data availability rendered estimation
impossible, so results for bank lending rates are only presented for the annual dataset.
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negative coefficient for both output and growth. I find that for the group of countries studied in the
annual dataset, this measure is only significant for growth rate measures using the de-facto measure
of financial openness, but I find a different sign than what was expected suggesting a harmful role
for the accumulation of reserves in the economy. Perhaps this is a reflection of economies that
were too cautious and saved too much at the expense of growth. Measures of openness are however
robust to the inclusion of the net reserves variable in this dataset. The quarterly dataset while
having the expected sign is not significant for both output and growth. In addition, I find that the
de-facto measure of financial openness is not robust to its inclusion, while the trade measure is.
1.3.3.3 Current Account Balance: Berkmen et. al (2009) also find evidence that lower current
account deficits are associated with a lower impact of financial crisis and as such, I expect that the
higher the current account balance (more positive), the lower the effect of the financial crisis
suggesting a negative coefficient. I find in the annual dataset that while the expected sign was
obtained, the coefficients were always insignificant and the trade and financial openness measures
were robust to its inclusion. The quarterly dataset however shows a strong significance with the
expected negative sign, confirming my hypothesis with only the trade openness measure being
robust to its inclusion.
1.3.3.4 Domestic Financial development: I use the ratio of domestic credit to GDP for both the
financial sector and the private sector as a proxy for this variable16. The assumption is that the
more developed an economy’s financial system, the higher the credit made available for sectors
that need it. This would imply a lower reliance on international financial transactions thereby
limiting the effects of the financial crisis. As a result, I expect that the higher the levels of domestic

16

Quarterly Data on domestic credit to the financial sector could not be obtained, so only the estimates from the
domestic credit to the private sector are reported
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credit, the lower the impact of the crisis, suggesting a negative coefficient for both proxies. For
the annual dataset, I find the expected sign and statistical significance with respect of output levels
but no significance with respect to growth. I also find that both measures of openness are robust
to the inclusion of this variable. For the quarterly dataset, I estimate a significant coefficient with
a different than expected sign with respect to output and an insignificant coefficient with the
expected sign with respect to growth, but both openness measures are robust to the inclusion of
this variable.
1.3.3.5 Exchange rates: I use the real and nominal effective exchange rates for this measure in
order to de-emphasize any advantage in exchange rates not originating from the country of interest.
This feature is inherently built in to this measure due to the fact that this variable measures a
currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies. Unlike the standard bilateral
exchange rate, an increase in the nominal or real effective exchange rate implies an appreciation
of the local currency17. The overall effect of an increase in the exchange rate is difficult to pin
down as it is due to the characteristics of the economy (export oriented or import reliant) as well
as the price and quantity effect. In my annual dataset, I find that only nominal effective exchange
rate is statistically significant with respect to output while both nominal and real effective
exchange rates are statistically significant with respect to growth. All these coefficients carry a
positive sign suggesting that an appreciation of an economy’s currency increases the impact of the
financial crisis. Also, trade openness is robust to the inclusion of these variables while financial
openness is ambiguous18. In the quarterly dataset, I find consistently negative coefficients with
only the nominal effective exchange rate’s effect on output levels being statistically significant.

17
18

The real effective exchange rate is the nominal divided by the price deflator
See tables 8-11
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Trade openness is once again robust to inclusion of these variables while financial openness is not
robust with respect to output and remains insignificant with respect to growth.
1.3.4 Accounting for the impact of openness on the speed of convergence
Next, I examine the effect of openness (both through trade and finance) on the speed of
convergence of each country to its pre-crisis paths of output and growth. To do this, I disaggregate
the quarterly panel dataset into individual time series for each country, and estimate the 
parameter (speed of convergence) for each country. I therefore estimate
DLevel j t   j1  DLevel j t 1   j 0   j1TO j t   j 2 FO j t    j11TO j t   j 21FO j t   j1t

(14)

DGrowth j t   j 2  DGrowth j t 1   j 0   j1TO j t   j 2 FO j t   

(15)

j

TO j t   21FO j t   j 2t

11

Where j is the index for each country in the sample, and other symbols are defined as above. Figure
11 below shows a chart of the different rates of speed at which each country converges to its precrisis paths for both growth and output. It is clear, as one would expect, that countries converge to
the pre-crisis path of growth much faster than that of output. The absolute values of the estimated

1j and 2j 19are plotted with the average measure of openness across the post crisis time periods
observed for each country. To determine the relationship beetween the speed of convergence and
the level of openness, I estimate the following two equations;

19

Only the estimates which were negative, signifying convergence were included in the graphs. The positive values
were omitted from the plots as the positive slopes could imply that the country’s post crisis path has been
permanently altered and the new path never converges to the old path, i.e. a permanent change in the trend of the
GDP. There were no positive estimates for the growth rate suggesting a return to pre-crisis path of growth for all
economies studied.
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Table 8: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DLEVEL/De-facto financial openness measure
Variable
Trade openness
Financial openness_De-facto
measure
Bank lending rates
Net Reserves
Current Account Balance
% domestic credit to Banks
% domestic credit to Private
sector
Real effective exchange rates
Nominal effective exchange
rate
Time fixed effects
Number of countries

-0.127***
0.02***

-0.11***
0.007

-0.13***
0.02***

DLEVEL
-0.13***
-0.13***
0.02***
0.02***

-0.128***
0.02**

-0.12***
0.03***

-0.15***
0.007

0.007***

-0.13***
-0.016
0.002
0.10
-0.001

-0.059
-0.03
-0.001***
-0.0001***

-0.002*
-0.0001

yes
50

yes
37

yes
50

yes
50

yes
49

yes
49

0.001**

0.001

yes
38

yes
26

yes
37
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Table 9: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DLEVEL/De-jure financial openness measure
Variable
Trade openness
Financial openness_Dejure measure
Bank lending rates
Net Reserves
Current Account Balance
% domestic credit to
Banks
% domestic credit to
Private sector
Real effective exchange
rates
Nominal effective
exchange rate
Time fixed effects
Number of countries

-0.14***
-0.08**

-0.11***
-0.08**

-0.14***
-0.08**

-0.14***
-0.07**

DLEVEL
-0.14***
-0.07*

-0.13***
-0.07**

-0.14***
-0.045

-0.16***
-0.056

0.006***

-0.14***
-0.08*
0.002
0.009
-0.01

-0.019
-0.02
-0.0006**
-0.0009***

-0.002*
0.0004
0.001***

yes
50

yes
37

Yes
50

yes
50

yes
49

yes
49

yes
37

yes
38

0.002
yes
26

Table 10: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DGROWTH/De-facto financial openness measure
Variable
Trade openness
Financial openness_De-facto
measure
Bank lending rates
Net Reserves
Current Account Balance
% domestic credit to Banks
% domestic credit to
Private sector
Real effective exchange rate
Nominal effective exchange
rate
Time fixed effects
Number of countries

-0.09**
-0.04***

-0.21***
-0.06***

-0.07**
-0.03***

DGROWTH
-0.10**
-0.12
-0.04*** -0.05**

-0.1
-0.04**

-0.14***
-0.05***

-0.16***
-0.04***

0.007***

-0.18
-0.06***
0.006*
0.05
0.04

0.2**
-0.08
-0.0005
0.0007

-0.001
0.004***
0.004***

YES
50

yes
36

yes
50

yes
50

Yes
49

yes
49

yes
37

yes
38

0.004**
yes
25
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Table 11: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DGROWTH/De-jure financial openness measure
Variable
Trade openness
Financial openness_De-jure
measure
Bank lending rates
Net Reserves
Current Account Balance
% domestic credit to Banks
% domestic credit to Private
sector
Real effective exchange rate
Nominal effective exchange
rate
Time fixed effects
Number of countries

-0.1**
0.07

-0.2***
0.02

-0.1**
0.06

-0.1**
0.06

DGROWTH
-0.1
0.07

-0.08
0.06

-0.14**
0.07

-0.2***
0.07

0.008***

-0.12
0.11
0.01**
0.07
-0.14

0.12
-0.07
-0.0004
0.0008

0.00002
0.005***
0.004***

yes
50

yes
36

yes
50

yes
50
33

yes
49

yes
49

yes
37

yes
38

0.003*
yes
25

Table 12: Quarterly Dataset Robustness checks – DLEVEL
Variable
Financial openness (long run)
Trade openness (long run)
Error Correction parameter
Net Reserves
Current Account Balance
% domestic credit to private sector
Real effective exchange rates
Nominal effective exchange rate
Financial openness (short run)
Trade openness (short run)
Time fixed effects
Number of countries

-0.0004***
0.141
-0.09***

DLEVEL
0.0008
-0.01***
-0.612*** -0.59***
-0.143*** -0.166***

0.004
-0.67***
-0.147***
-0.019

-0.002
-0.634***
-0.138***

-0.002
-0.60***
-0.140***

-0.0006
-0.677***
-0.17***
-0.037***
-0.673***
0.043***

-0.001***
0.003
-0.299***
yes
26

-0.002***
-0.002
-0.31***
yes
23

-0.396***
0.059***
-0.0005
-0.008
-0.47***
yes
30

-0.014
-0.39***
yes
30

-0.013
-0.395***
yes
30

-0.022
-0.443***
yes
24

0.002
-0.304***
yes
26
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Table 13: Quarterly Dataset Robustness checks – DGROWTH
Variable
Financial openness (long run)
Trade openness (long run)
Error Correction parameter
Net Reserves
Current Account Balance
% domestic credit to private sector
Real effective exchange rates
Nominal effective exchange rate
Financial openness (short run)
Trade openness (short run)
Time fixed effects
Number of countries

-0.00002
0.05**
-0.813***

-0.00002
0.05**
-0.814***
-0.003

DGROWTH
-0.00002
-0.00002
0.04**
0.06**
-0.812*** -0.774***

-0.00002
0.05**
-0.792***

-0.00002
0.05**
-0.793***

-0.00002
0.05
-0.734***
0.0001
-0.176***
0.006*

-0.00002
0.004
-0.391***
yes
26

-0.0002**
-0.002
-0.41***
yes
21

-0.168***
-0.0006
-0.00002
-0.009
-0.499***
yes
30

-0.009
-0.499***
yes
30

-0.009
-0.492***
yes
30

34

-0.02
-0.55***
yes
24

0.004
-0.392***
yes
26

speedli  c1   1 ATOi   2 AFOi   i

(16)

speedgi  c2   3 ATOi   4 AFOi   i

(17)

Where
speedli is the magnitude of the speed of convergence to pre-crisis path of GDP for country i
speedgi is the magnitude of the speed of convergence to pre-crisis path of growth for country i
ATOi is the average measure of trade openness in the sample period examined for country i
AFOi is the average measure of financial openness in the sample period examined for country i

Figure 11: Speed of convergence to Pre-Crisis paths of GDP and Growth

Table 14 below shows the results of the estimates of equations 16 and 17. The results from the
table 14 below show that there is no statistically significant relationship between the level of
openness and the speed of convergence to the pre-crisis paths of output and growth. This suggests
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that country specific factors or other aggregate measures not captured here are responsible for
determining the speed of convergence and not openness.
Table 14: Results showing the relationship between openness and speed of convergence
speedl

Dependent
Variable
1
ATO
AFO

speedg

2

3

1

0.203
-0.0112

-0.358

-0.009

0.075

2

3

-0.000002

-0.358
-0.000002

*,**, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
1, 2 and 3 are different regressions run with ATO alone, AFO alone and ATO and AFO together respectively
Estimating equations 16 and 17 using Ordinary least squares estimation procedure
Where ATO is the average trade openness and AFO is the average financial openness of each country in the post crisis
time period studied (2008 – 2013)

1.3.5 Accounting for the impact of openness over time
Finally, I observe the relationship between the impact of the crisis and openness over time. I once
again disaggregate the quarterly panel datasets into individual time series and estimate regression
equations for each country in the sample. These regressions are similar to previous regressions
run, with the added assumption that the estimated coefficients vary over time. This provides a
better understanding of the relationship between the impact of a crisis and openness measures over
time by providing a more accurate picture of the response of each country’s economy to the
financial crisis determining whether or not the role of openness is indeed asymmetric, ergo, I
estimate the following regression equations and use the state space model with the Kalman filter
approach to estimate the time varying parameters.:
DLevel j t   j 0t   j1tTO j t 1   j 2t FO j t 1   j1t

18

Dgrowth j t   j 0 't   j 3tTO j t 1   j 4t FO j t 1   2jt

19
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Where j is the index for each country in the sample with other symbols defined as above. In this
paper, I assume that coefficients follow a random walk over time. This is because I assume that
countries would base future decisions of level of openness on the impact of the previous level of
openness. As such, the coefficients evolve according to the following equation:

it  it 1  vi ,t for i = 1,2,3 and 4
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Where i is the index for each coefficient in equations 18 and 19, and vi ,t is the shock to each
coefficient.
The results of these estimates from the GAUSS statistical package are plotted for output and
growth for each country in the appendix. From the graphs, it is clear to see first and foremost that
countries are more responsive to trade openness than they are to financial openness, as suggested
in the panel regressions above. Secondly, almost all countries experience a sharp increase in the
relationship between trade openness and DLEVEL within the first few quarters, indicating the
period of contraction of the crisis, showing the role of trade openness as a vector. However, the
decline in the responsiveness to trade openness seems to suggest that, while trade openness still
continued to increase the deviation from the predicted path, it did so at a decreasing rate, and in
some cases, eventually reverted to a negative relationship suggesting a decline in the deviation.
Third, it is also evident that financial openness does not contribute to the deviation as much as
trade openness, and in some cases, helps to retard the magnitude of deviation from the predicted
path, confirming trade openness’ role as the major vector of propagation. The variation in effects
of financial openness across countries might be due to the de-facto measure used, which does not
capture different countries’ attitude towards inflow of capital. The same initial spike in the
relationship between the impact and trade openness is also observed with respect to growth, with
37

some countries also showing that downward trend suggesting positive benefits to becoming more
open via trade after the contraction of a crisis, indicating its role as a cure.
1.4

Conclusion

In this paper, I set out to determine the role of openness in an economy during a crisis. Using two
datasets: annual and quarterly, I examine different aspects of the relationship between openness
and the impact of a crisis including: “distance”, “speed”, and “time”. Distance is defined as the
deviation from the pre-crisis paths of output and growth, speed is defined as the rate of return to
the pre-crisis paths, and time deals with the relationship between the impact of a crisis and
openness as time progresses. Taking the financial crisis of 2008 as a case study, my main result
suggests that both trade and financial openness have different effects on the impact of the crisis
depending on the length of time studied, i.e. short or long run. I also find a dual role for both types
of openness acting as both a vector that negatively impacts the economy during a crisis and as a
cure that also helps return the economy to its pre-crisis paths.
One major source of discrepancy in the literature addressed in this study is the variation in results
obtained from utilizing different measures of financial openness20, and as with other studies, I find
that discrepancy here as well. The explanation might be the fact that the de-jure measure offers
insight about an economy’s tolerance for foreign participation in its domestic markets and makes
no claim to its attitude towards local participation in foreign markets as the de-facto measure does.
The consequence being, economies that rank higher on the de-jure measure, classified as more
financially open, make it more palatable for foreigners to invest in their economy, especially
during times of crisis. This in turn serves as a boost that increases the economy’s performance,

20

de-jure vs de-facto measures of financial openness
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indicating a positive contribution of financial openness.

The de-facto measure does not

differentiate between foreign participation in local markets and local participation in foreign
markets and as such, might capture an outflow of resources from an economy (more financially
open), yielding a negative contribution of financial openness.
In examining the speed of recovery, I find that countries converge faster to their pre-crisis path of
growth rates than they do to their pre-crisis path of output, giving more weight to the initial
assumption in this paper, that a return to pre-crisis levels of growth does not imply a return to
normalcy. I also find no evidence of a relationship between the speed of convergence and the level
of openness. While preliminary evidence points to the possibility that countries that are more open
via trade converge faster to their pre-crisis paths of output but slower to their pre-crisis level of
growth, and that countries that are more financially open converge slower to pre-crisis paths of
both output and growth, these relationships are however proven to be statistically unsubstantiated.
I also disaggregate the panel structure to obtain individual time series for each country, and using
a time varying parameter approach, allow the coefficients of trade openness and financial openness
to vary over time21. This is perhaps the most convincing evidence of the dual roles of both types
of openness during the financial crisis, as both the vector through which the contagion spreads and
a tool through which the impact is lessened over time.

21

Results in appendix 1.2
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Appendix 1.1
Table A.1 below is a list of all countries in the two main datasets used in this paper
Full Annual dataset
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo
Verde, Chile, Hong Kong, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Malta, Moldova, Namibia, Netherland, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States, Zambia.
Full Quarterly Dataset
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden , Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States
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Table A.2 below outlines the variables used in this study, as well as the sources of the data
Variable
GDP level
Growth
rate
Trade
openness

Description

Source

Annual
Gross domestic product of the
World Bank development
country, every quarter or every year Indicator
First difference of GDP level World Bank development
measures for both quarterly and Indicator
annual data
Summation of total exports and total World Bank development
imports as a fraction of GDP
Indicator

Financial
openness:
De-facto
measure
Financial
Openness:
De-jure
measure
Lending
rates

Summation
of
international investment
(Assets and Liabilities) as
of GDP
Chinn-Ito measure of
openness.

country’s International Financial
positions Statistics
a fraction

Bank Lending rates

International Financial
Statistics

Net
Reserves

Net Reserves (With Fund record)

IMF Balance of Payments
database

Current
Account
Balance
Domestic
Credit to
Financial
Sector
Domestic
Credit to
Private
sector
Real
Effective
exchange
rate
Nominal
Effective
Exchange
rate

Balance from Current and Capital IMF Balance of Payments
account
database

Quarterly
OECD stats
OECD stats

International
Financial
Statistics
International
Financial
Statistics

financial http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn- N/A
Ito_website.htm

Domestic credit to financial World Bank development
institutions as a fraction of GDP
Indicator

International
Financial
Statistics
IMF Balance of
Payments
database
IMF Balance of
Payments
database
N/A

Domestic credit to non-financial World Bank development
institutions as a fraction of GDP
Indicator

Bank of
International
Settlements

Real effective exchange rates index International Financial
(2010 Base year)
Statistics

International
Financial
Statistics

Nominal Effective exchange rates International Financial
(2010 Base year)
Statistics

International
Financial
Statistics
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Table A.3 below shows the selected AR approximations of the different datasets
Dataset

Process

SIC value

Annual

AR(0)
AR(1)
AR(2)**
AR(3)
AR(4)

0.883996
-3.070718
-3.267185*
-3.256608
-3.228025

Rejected coefficients
(95% C.I)
AR(3)
AR(3), AR(4)

-1.149958
-6.058698*
-6.043402
-6.039677
-6.031011

AR(2)
AR(3), AR(4)

Quarterly

AR(0)
AR(1)**
AR(2)
AR(3)
AR(4)

*signifies the smallest SIC value, **signifies the chosen AR process
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Appendix 1.2
The following graphs depict the evolution of the response of the level of deviation from an
economy’s pre crisis GDP and growth paths to changes in their level of openness in the post-crisis
periods for all 30 countries in the quarterly data sample studied.
Figures 1 & 2: Australia
Level
Growth

Figures 3 & 4: Austria
Level
Growth

Figures 5 & 6: Belgium
Level
Growth

Figures 7 & 8: Brazil
Level
Growth

Figures 9 & 10: Canada
Level
Growth

Figures 11 & 12: Chile
Level
Growth

Figures 13 & 14: Czech Republic
Level
Growth

Figures 15 & 16: Denmark
Level
Growth

Figures 17 & 18: Estonia
Level
Growth

Figures 19 & 20: Finland
Level
Growth

Figures 21 & 22: Germany
Level
Growth

Figures 23 & 24: Greece
Level
Growth
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Figures 25 & 26: Hungary
Level
Growth

Figures 27 & 28: Iceland
Level
Growth

Figures 29 & 30: India
Level
Growth

Figures 31 & 32: Israel
Level
Growth

Figures 33 & 34: Italy
Level
Growth

Figures 35 & 36: Korea
Level
Growth

Figures 37 & 38: Luxembourg
Level
Growth

Figures 39 & 40: Netherlands
Level
Growth

Figures 41 & 42: New Zealand
Level
Growth

Figures 43 & 44: Poland
Level
Growth
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Figures 45 & 46: Portugal
Level
Growth

Figures 47 & 48: Slovak Republic
Level
Growth

Figures 49 & 50: Spain
Level
Growth

Figures 51 & 52: Sweden
Level
Growth

Figures 53 & 54: Switzerland
Level
Growth

Figures 55 & 56: Turkey
Level
Growth

Figures 57 & 58: United Kingdom
Level
Growth

Figures 59 & 60: United States
Level
Growth
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Chapter 2
The Role of Risk in Bilateral Trade
2.1

Introduction

As is well known, distance in the discourse of international trade and gravity models is a proxy for
transportation costs, as illustrated by the familiar iceberg shipping cost principle: if an iceberg is
sailed across the ocean from a given origin point to a given destination point, the melted ice lost
along the way is viewed as transport cost, hence the association between distance and cost. Let us
now add to this familiar principle, the varying weather conditions between the origin and
destination. The amount of ice arriving at the destination would then undoubtedly vary even though
the distance remains the same. The unpredictable nature of the weather in this case produces a new
dimension in the size of ice reaching the destination, that of uncertainty. Such uncertainty gives
rise to perceived risk, therefore accounting for the role of risk in trade flow determination is
potentially as relevant as the role of distance. Risk here is generally defined as the uncertainty
associated with any potential event that could result in an alteration of a previously agreed upon volume of
exports (or imports). Specifically, I use the World Governance Indicator measure of political instability and
the presence of terrorist activities proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) as a proxy for risk. This measure is
an aggregate of household perceptions from surveys about Government stability as well as measures of
internal and external conflicts and ethnic tensions. It also encompasses statistics including frequencies of
political killings, disappearances and tortures. All of which make this an ideal measure to capture
perceptions about the risk rating of a country in order to determine if these perceptions influence trading
decisions.

Several theories have been developed over the course of time that attempt to explain the existence
of bilateral trade. These theories range from the Ricardian theory, which proposes that trade is
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generated by differences in cross country technological endowments22, to the Heckscher-OhlinSamuelson theory, which suggests that trade is a result of differences in country factor
endowments, to Paul Krugman’s theory that trade is a result of consumers’ preferences for variety
and economies of scale in production. While these theories and their numerous derivatives or
extensions have been validated at some point or another, they mainly determine which goods are
traded and the reasons why these goods emerge as import or export goods in each country. But
once a country determines its export capabilities and its import needs based on its level of
technology, factor endowments or consumer preferences, the final decision of which country with
whom to engage in trade still remains. These theories, however, do not extend to a country’s choice
in trading partners as the theoretical assumptions restrict the number of available trading partners
such that, when a country decides to trade, there is only one available option. In reality though,
this is not the case. There are many potential trading partners and these models do not provide any
insight on how a country chooses its trading partner from the available choices; it is this missing
link in trade theory that has given rise to the gravity equation.
The gravity equation is a very successful empirical finding that shows that the value of bilateral
trade between countries is positively correlated with the sizes of their economies (GDP) and is
negatively correlated with the distance between them. Essentially, a country chooses its trading
partners based on similar production capacities and the distance between them. While one of the
earliest criticisms of the gravity model after its inception by Tinbergen (1962) was its lack of
theoretical foundations, recent research has incorporated the basic theoretical foundations in
international trade into the gravity model. These studies have eliminated the initial concern and

22

This leads to comparative advantage in the production of a particular good, which in turn leads to specialization
and exportation of that good.

49

have led to a wider acceptance of this empirical finding (Anderson, 2011). For example, Evenett
and Keller (1998) investigate possible theoretical validations of the gravity equation by examining
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory and the theory of increasing returns to verify whether
either theory has significant explanatory power to account for the success of the gravity model.
They find that both models explain various components of the differences in trade volumes
between countries and that these various components have implications for productivity growth
and labor. Their findings support the gravity equation’s proposed relationship between trade and
GDP, but shed no light on the trade - distance relationship.
Feenstra and Markusen (2001) also try to reconcile the existing theoretical models of international
trade with the empirical success of the gravity equation. They argue that different theories in
international trade predict differences in key parameter values generated by the gravity model.
These differences arise if goods are either differentiated or homogenous across trading partners
and whether or not there is a barrier to trade (high tariffs or sanctions).
A survey of the literature on the gravity equation shows just how successful this empirical model
has been in describing trade flows. Studies such as the one carried out by Baier and Bergstrand
(2001) provide some insight into the reasons for increased international trade, using the gravity
model as their empirical tool. They investigate the relevance of a reduction in transportation costs,
multilateral and bilateral trade liberalization, income growth and convergence in growth to changes
in trade flows. Using data from OECD countries between the 1950s and the 1980s, they find that
income growth accounts for about 67% of the increase in international trade, with 25% being
explained by liberalization (reduction in trade tariffs), and about 8% due to decline in
transportation costs. They find that convergence in growth has little to no effect on the increase in
trade. This suggests that the gravity equation provides an explanation for at most 75% of the
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increase in international trade. Crucially, however, this does not shed any light on the pre-existing
trade flows between any given pair trading partners.
Subsequently, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) tested the effects of country pair variables that
encourage the formation of Free Trade agreements. They consider distance between the trading
partners, remoteness of trading partners compared to the rest of the world, similarities in
production (GDP), the size of the trading partners compared to the size of other countries, and
relative factor endowments. They find that these factors accurately predict 85% of the 286 Free
trade agreements in place as at 1996 and 97% of the other countries who do not have free trade
agreements. While these results indicate the success of gravity model, and in particular the role of
distance, in forming free trade agreements, they do not shed any further light on the accuracy of
the gravity models in predicting actual trade flows.
Chaney (2011) in his attempt to explain the success of the gravity model establishes a theory to
explain the validity of the trade-distance relationship proposed by the gravity model. He asserts
that firms can only export (or import) from markets to which they have access. He suggests that
these firms acquire more access based on the connections that they had previously acquired, and
distance initially is a hindrance to access of these markets and as such, bilateral trade is inversely
proportional to the distance between trading partners. This finding of “path-dependence” of trade
based on initial distance highlights perhaps a major reason why distance continues to be a major
determinant of trade flows, even as transportation costs have decreased significantly over time and
trade has liberalized immensely.
Kimura and Lee (2006) extend the success of the gravity model to include trade in services as well
as goods. They assess the impact of various factors on bilateral trade in services as opposed to
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trade in goods with data from 10 OECD countries in 1999 and 2000. They find that the gravity
model fits the data for bilateral trade in services even better than that of bilateral trade in goods.
They also find that there is a positive correlation between goods exports and imports of services.
This implies that data on trade flows can encompass both goods and services when running gravity
model equations.
Despite the success of the gravity model, a few limitations have emerged in several recent studies.
A description of these limitations highlight the reasons why this study is relevant to the literature
on gravity models of trade. Thus, an exposition of these limitations is followed by that of my own
contribution. Helpman et. al. (2007) who focus on firm heterogeneity and differences in the
number of exporting firms across countries, decompose total trade value into trade per exporting
firm and the number of exporting firms. They discover a bias of the traditional estimates based on
the gravity model, primarily due to the fact that the number of exporting firms in each country is
not separately accounted for and in effect is inherently assumed not to vary. Essentially, the fact
that the number and type of firms differ across countries might in itself, be the very reason for
trade between these countries, a fact that is not explicitly captured in the gravity equation.
In the same vein as Helpman et. al., Rose and Spiegel (2002) argue that there is a relationship
between international trade and Country lending choices suggesting yet another factor that might
influence trade flows between countries. They show theoretically that countries do not default on
their debts to avoid sanctions that will diminish international trade, and as such, suggest that
creditors should lend to countries that have close ties via trade. As a result of this, it is clear that
there are other cross country relationships that could influence the choice in trading partners or
amount of trade between country pairs not captured in the standard gravity model. Furthermore, a
country’s commitment to debt repayment sends a signal of credibility to a potential trading partner
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and as such, could bias countries to engage in trade. This finding highlights a potential measure of
a country’s risk measure. Countries that default on their debt payments could potentially be viewed
as high risk trading partners for the exact same reasons they are not able to make their debt
payments (low productivity, negative shocks, unsustainable debts, etc.)
Paramount among all the recent critiques of the gravity model is the finding by Brun et. al. (2003),
as this study casts doubt on the distance-trade relationship, which is central to the gravity equation.
They show that the efficiency of the distance measure in predicting trade flows has decreased with
the passage of time. Using a time varying parameter approach on 130 countries between 1962 and
1996, they measure the impact of distance as a determinant of bilateral trade over time. They
initially discover that the elasticity of the absolute value of bilateral trade with respect to distance
increases over the years. They attribute this to a decline in transportation costs not related to
distance such as handling fees, but an increase in distance related costs such as oil prices. They
then find that if an “augmented23” barrier-to-trade function is introduced, there is an 11% decline
in the elasticity in the same set of countries over the 30 year period investigated. They also note
that this decline is prominent in trade between developed countries. This finding gives support to
the idea that with increasing technology, transportation costs decline which minimizes the
importance of distance as a predictor for bilateral trade creating room for the introduction of a new
determinant of bilateral trade.
It is these critiques, especially the last, that pave the way for my contribution. In particular, the
critiques imply that the gravity equation in its present formulation, and particularly the role of
distance may be losing its explanatory power of global trade flows due to factors ranging from
23

They augment the standard specification of the gravity model by introducing an index for quality of infrastructure,
the cost of oil and a proxy for freight costs between primary products and manufactures to the transport cost function
that is the basis of distance-trade relationship in the gravity equation.
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globalization, to technological advances, and reduced transportation costs. These factors have
allowed countries to begin to overcome the initial distance barrier that once hampered trade.
Thus, new determinants of trade flows must be sought and new variables investigated and
incorporated in the standard gravity model. This is where my contribution lies. I suggest a “riskaugmented” approach to the original iceberg shipping cost model that led to the inclusion of
distance, as summarized earlier. So far, the literature has considered two major sources of risk that
can influence trade; wars and exchange rate fluctuations. These two variables can impact trade
flows through the degree of risk that they impose on both the supply (Exports) side and demand
(Imports) side: wars through uncertainty due to supply shocks or export disruptions and currency
fluctuations through importer uncertainty and difficult contract negotiations.
There have been several studies carried out on the effects of wars on trade flows. For the most part,
economists have suggested a negative correlation between trade and wars. Most recently, Karam
and Zaki (2015) introduce a dummy variable to the standard gravity model which indicates the
presence of war, in order to determine what effect wars have on trade flows in countries in the
Middle East and North Africa. They find that the presence of wars in these regions have a
significantly negative impact on trade flows. They also find that this negative impact is on
manufactured goods and wars have little to no effect on the trade in services. This finding is a
corroboration of the work by Bayer and Rupert (2004), who find that civil wars not only negatively
impact trade in afflicted countries, but in partners who take sides in these conflicts. There are
however, other findings that seem to suggest a positive impact of war on trade flows. Gholz and
Press (2001), suggest that the effects of wars might be over exaggerated particularly when looking
at the impact of wars on Neutral countries. The argument for a negative impact of wars on neutral
states is the loss of trade partnerships with countries now devoting their resources to fighting these
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wars. They suggest that this loss is only just a decline in the efficiency from moving from the old
best choice to a new best choice, and that these neutral countries as a result of the war can benefit
by exporting goods to the warring countries, and expanding export activities to markets previously
dominated by the warring states.
The dual nature of the effects of wars on trade is not the biggest issue with this as a proxy measure
for risk in determining trade. Apart from the fact that war is a realization of an extreme that is only
present in a few countries and only at certain times, and as such does not account for trade flows
for a majority of countries for a significant amount of time, there is also the potential for reverse
causality between war and trade. Jackson and Nei (2015) theoretically show that trade agreements
decrease the likelihood of interstate wars and thus, trade has a stabilizing effect in regions. They
also attribute the decline in conflicts post 1950, to trade agreements and show that this is also
consistent with their model.
The second way in which risk has been introduced in the literature as a determinant of bilateral
trade is through currency fluctuations. There is a consensus that currency fluctuations can impact
trade flows either through the exchange rate volatility or currency misalignment. Auboin and Ruta
(2012) suggest that the mechanism through which exchange rates impact trade is the level of
uncertainty that it instills in traders, while currency misalignments; which is a deviation from the
equilibrium exchange rate, can lead to inefficient allocation of resources between tradable and
non-tradable goods which ultimately has an impact on export growth. Eichengreen and Irwin
(1995) study the impact of commercial and financial policies on trade in the 1930s. They find that
commercial policies weakened the relationship between income and trade and that exchange rate
volatility negatively impacted trade. This finding was also supported by Tenreyro and Barro (2003)
who find that common currencies increase trade between partner countries. Broll and Eckwert
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(1999) however, theoretically postulate a situation through which exchange rate volatility could
have a positive impact on trade flows, but only in firms that have access to wide local markets and
can adapt quickly to these short term fluctuations in order to capitalize on them. Baron (1976)
suggests that the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade can be minimized by exchange rate
hedging, but Auboin and Ruta (2012) counter that argument by suggesting that the increased cost
of exchange rate hedging, will lead to more expensive imports, and will still have a negative impact
on trade. Auboin and Ruta (2012) also state that there is mixed empirical evidence of the effects
of exchange rate volatility on trade in the literature, a view also supported by Bearce and Fisher
(2002). They observe that the effect of volatility on trade is small and not robust. This conclusion
is strengthened by Broda and Romalis (2003) who show the existence of reverse causality between
trade and exchange rates and state that accounting for this reverse causality reduces the impact of
exchange rate volatility on trade. They find evidence that exchange rate volatility affects trade in
differentiated products, but has no effect on where a commodity gets sold and that trade in all
products affects the exchange rate volatility. These two results not only show the reverse causality
between trade and exchange rate volatility, but also serve to identify a way to resolve this issue.
They posit that since commodity trade is only affected by the price levels and not by volatility, the
one-way effect of volatility on trade is only on differentiated products. They find that adjusting for
this reduces the estimated effect of currency unions on trade from 300% to between 10 and 25%.
Furthermore, Nicita (2013) looking at trade flows in 100 countries between 2000 and 2009 find
that currency misalignment is more important than exchange rate volatility when looking at the
impact on trade.
In general, when considering uncertainty (risk) as a determinant of trade, there is a potential for
reverse causality between risk and trade flow. Certain types of country idiosyncratic risks could
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be the reason why countries engage in trade in the first place. Kanniainen and Mustonen (2010)
study international trade agreements from a risk management perspective. They suggest that
countries engage in trade agreements to compensate for unforeseen negative shocks to
productivity, in essence, countries mitigate idiosyncratic (Country specific) risk by “insuring”
against those negative shocks to production. Using bilateral trades in Finland, they conclude that
international trade has provided more efficient risk management mainly through diversification.
This finding seems to point to a reverse causality between bilateral trade and risk. On the one hand,
trade is used to mitigate idiosyncratic risk, and on the other, risk is a driving force that might
determine trade volume. It would be useful to distinguish between the different sources of risk, in
order to determine which could influence trading decisions and which could be caused by trade so
as to eliminate the reverse causality problem.
Given the fact that previous measures of risk in bilateral trade flows have been subject to reverse
causality and endogeneity, I propose an exogenous and more encompassing variable to measure
risk and study its effects on bilateral trade: The level of political stability and the absence of
terrorist attacks proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Massimo (2010). A higher ranking signifies a
less risky trade partner, and a lower ranking signifies a riskier partner. This measure is perhaps the
most exogenous measure of within country source of risk, as the variables captured within it as
mentioned above, tend to be very unpredictable and as such, cannot be influenced by trade. It
should be noted that this measure is more general and also encompasses the presence of wars in
any region. A country such as Nigeria is not presently engaged in any official wars, but the
presence of the terrorist group Boko Haram and the government’s efforts to eliminate this threat,
presents a significant level of risk captured by this measure but not by that of the war indicator
variable. Furthermore, countries currently at war are also captured by this variable when
57

considering the level of political instability in these regions. To illustrate the potential of these
perceptions of risk to influence trade flows, consider the following figures illustrating annual trade
flows in India, Nigeria and the United States:
Figure 12: Risk and Trade: Nigeria’s trade flows
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Figure 13a & b: Risk and Trade: India’s trade flows24

24

India is split into these two graphs in order to better illustrate the decline in trade pre 2000, as trade flows are
much higher than they were in the 90s.
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Figure 14: Risk and Trade: United States’ trade flows
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Ignoring the effects of diminished trade during the financial crisis, periods of unrest in these
countries are often accompanied by a decline in either imports or exports. Figure 1 which shows
the trade flows of Nigeria, depict slumps in trade during periods corresponding to the Jos Riots
in 2001 and the increase in Boko Haram activities post 201025. Figures 2a and 2b which depict
the trade flows for India, capture reductions in imports in 1984 and 1991 respectively
corresponding to the assassinations of the Indian Prime Ministers of the time26, as well as in
2013 following Militant attacks in Srinagar, Explosions in Hyderbad and riots in
Muzaffarnagar27. Even a global power house like the United states is not exempt from this trend,
as a noticeable decline in both imports and exports is observed post 2001 after the world trade
center bombing. While these may be purely coincidental, it warrants a thorough investigation
into the effect of the perceived risk (uncertainty) generated by these events on trade flows.

25

http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/africa/nigeria-year-of-attacks/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/21/newsid_2504000/2504739.stm
27
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In order to do this, an empirical model of the gravity equation featuring risk is estimated using data
from 169 exporting countries trading with 178 partner countries between 2002 and 201328 to
determine whether this assumption of a role for risk in bilateral trade can be generalized, Figure 5
shows a scatter plot of the log of the average exports the countries in the dataset and the average
of their risk rating in the time period studied.
Figure 15: Export-Risk Rank Scatter plot

There is an observable upward trend in the scatterplot indicating that the higher the risk ranking of
the country (implying less risk), the higher the exports from that country. While this is not
conclusive proof of the role of risk in trade, it suggests an inverse relationship between the level
of risk and trade, which I verify empirically.
Determining the reasons for a country’s choice in trading partners has several advantages, the first
of which is a more accurate prediction of trade flows. The ability to better predict trade flows

28

yielding 30,241 partnerships over a 12-year period
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between countries can potentially increase the accuracy in predicting GDP of which trade flows is
a major component. It can also lead to more accurate trade policies instituted by policy makers in
countries to either nurture burgeoning industries or provide needed goods and services to the
consumers within their borders. Another benefit would be to gain insights into other reasons for
the discrepancy in levels of development. It has been established that there are benefits from trade.
These benefits are only realized as long as countries enter into a trading agreement and agree to
provide each other with goods and services. This then begs the question; is specialization and
subsequent production alone sufficient to attract countries to enter into a trading agreement with a
particular country or are there other considerations that determine trading partnerships and flows?
There is always the possibility that the goods being produced are scarce or indispensable, and as
such, trading partners might overlook any other shortcomings to engage in trade. This is the best
case scenario and is still subject to certain drawbacks. As a result of the relative value of the good
in question, the exporting country could possibly suffer from a resource curse, or the debilitating
effects of the “Dutch” disease phenomenon, both of which yield lower than optimal rates of
growth. Figure 2 below shows the scatter plot of the average risk measures of the countries studied
in this paper between 2002 and 2013 and their ranks according to their levels of development
captured by the human development index measures in 2013.
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Figure 1629: Risk rank – HDI rank scatter plot

From this plot, the obvious downward trend suggests that the countries with a lower risk rank
(riskier) are developing countries, and those with the higher risk rating (less risky) are developed
countries. A possible conclusion that can be drawn from figures 1 and 2 could be that if the risk
rating does in fact affect the level of trade flows between countries, and by extension, trade
partnership choice, it becomes quite clear that developing countries will not be able to trade as
much with their developed counterparts, possibly reducing the potential gains from exports that
could have otherwise bridged the gap between developed and developing countries, thus partially
accounting for the continued discrepancy between them.
The traditional gravity model suggests that the only way for a country to alter trade flows is to
increase its level of production, since nothing can be done about its geographical distance from its
trading partner. In reality though, increasing production does not necessarily translate into
increased trade flows if there are fundamental issues causing potential trading partners to refuse

29

The United Nations Development Program classifies countries ranked between 1 and 49 as having a very high
level of human development, 50 to 102 as having just a high level, 103 to 144 as having a medium level, and 145 to
199 as having a low level of human development.
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entry into trading agreements. The introduction of risk however, suggests that if policy makers
address the sources of country specific risk that potential trading partners find off-putting, interest
in trade will be generated increasing trade flows and ultimately, enhancing growth. The closest
study to this was one carried out by deGroot et al, in 2004 (Henceforth called DEA). In their bid
to test the effect of institutions on trade, they use an earlier version of the risk measure which I
propose and determine that there is positive effect of both partners’ risk measure (which they
interpret as a measure of institution) on trade flows30. This study differs significantly than the
earlier version of DEA’s in the following ways. First, the measure used in this chapter has been
improved and now encompasses 31 underlying sources as opposed to the 17 sources in the version
used in the DEA 2004 paper, yielding more accurate measures (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Secondly,
the DEA study is a cross sectional study for a hundred countries’ exports in 1998, while this chapter
is a panel data set of 168 countries between 2002 and 2013. Perhaps, the most significant difference
is captured by world attitude to risk post 1998. Consider figure 17 below which depicts the number
of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2013. There were relatively fewer number of attacks in 1998
as compared to the time period studied in this chapter. Due to the drastic increase in terrorist
activities, the effect of risk on trade flows is expected to be much more pronounced than is
observed in DEA. Ultimately, the method of transmission from this measure to trade is
fundamentally different, while DEA suggests that the actual occurrence of these factors affect the
ability of a country’s firms to export, I suggest that the perception of risk due to the presence of
these factors affects firm decisions with regard to trade volumes and partnership choice.

30

The findings in this study defer significantly as it pertains to the relationship between exports and partner country
risk. See results in Table 15 below.
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Figure 17: Number of terrorist incidents from 1970 to 201431

The rest of this paper is organized as follows; section two provides some intuition behind the
introduction of risk in bilateral trade as well as the empirical method and data used in this analysis.
Section three discusses the results of the analysis and interpretations, while section four concludes.
2.2 Intuition and Empirical approach
The iceberg shipping cost assumption that relates greater distance to greater transportation costs
can be augmented to allow for the introduction of risk as a determinant of trade flows as
highlighted earlier. With the introduction of uncertainty, a case can be made for a relationship
between the risk posed by a trading partner and the trade flows between those partners. These
sources of risk include within country sources like productivity shocks to the exporting country,
nationwide strikes that halt production or hampers the processing rates at shipping ports, political
and social instability, epidemics and natural disasters, as well as external sources such as accidents
during transportation, or wanton acts of piracy. In general, I expect to find a significant and

31

Source: Global Terrorism Database
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negative correlation between trade flows and trading partners’ levels of risk in an empirical
analysis.
For this analysis however, the country specific measure of risk used is the level of political stability
and the absence of violence and terrorism in a country. This measure captures the likelihood that
the government of the country will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. This is a World Governance
indicator that provides a percentile ranking system between 0 and 100% where the safer (riskless)
countries have a higher score and the less safe (riskier) countries have a lower score. This implies
that if the risk rating of the country is high, it is less risky and would suggest a higher level of
exports from that country. Therefore, a positive coefficient of this measure of risk expected in the
regression. With the balanced trade hypothesis or a less stringent variation of it which supposes a
positive correlation between exports and imports, this finding would imply that both imports and
exports between trading partners depend on not just distance, but the risk associated with a
particular trading partner.
The literature on the gravity models has been divided with regard to the correct specification of
the empirical model applied in the panel data estimation: fixed effect versus random effect models.
According to Gomez Herrera and Baleix (2012), the fixed effects approach would be ideal as this
requires a potential correlation between the unobserved fixed effects and the other country specific
regressors. The estimation of this process however eliminates all time-invariant regressors that are
key determinants of trade such as distance, contiguity and other dummy variables, due to
collinearity. On the other hand, the use of the random effects approach requires a stronger zero
correlation assumption between the unobserved fixed effects and the other regressors. However,
advocates of the approach argue that the use of country partner fixed effects instead of country
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fixed effects decreases the likelihood of correlation between these unobserved fixed effects and
the other regression variables, i.e. while specific unobserved country fixed effects will be highly
correlated with the output and risk measures of that country, the unobserved partner fixed effects
will have less to do with the individual country and as such, is more likely to be uncorrelated. This
assumption is in line with the findings of Fratianni and Oh (2007) who test both these approaches
on a panel dataset of 143 countries between 1980 and 2003 and determine that the random effect
model is preferred to that of the fixed effect model.

With this background, I adopt a random

effects approach in estimation.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Estimation and Results
The empirical model estimated is shown below:

expijt  0  1GDP expit  2GDPpart jt  3distij  4risk expit  5riskpart jt  6contigij
7comlangij  8comcolij  9col 45ij  10colonyij  11curcolij   ijt
Where

expijt is the value of exports from country i to partner j at time t

GDP expit is the natural log of GDP of exporting country i at time t
GDPpart jt is the natural log of GDP of the partner country j at time t
distij is the natural log of the distance between partner countries

risk expit is the risk measure of the exporting country i

at time

riskpart jt is the risk measure of the partner country j at time t
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t

(21)

contigij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j are contiguous (share a border)

comlangij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j share a common language
comcolij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a common colonizer
after 1945

colonyij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have ever had a colonial
relationship

col 45ij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a colonial relationship
after 1945

curcolij is a dummy variable indicating whether both countries are currently in a colonial
relationship
Columns 1 2 and 3 of Table 15 below show the regression results derived from equation 21.
In the first column, the standard gravity model is estimated in order to test the validity of the
selected sample. The findings of the traditional gravity model are verified implying that the
selected sample conforms to the findings in other studies. The second column tests the validity of
determining trade flows based on risk measures alone. There is a positive and statistically
significant relationship between exports and the risk measure of the exporting country and a
negative but statistically insignificant relationship between exports and the risk rating of the
partner country. This finding supports the hypothesis in as much as trade seems to be influenced
by risk, but this however does not align with the prediction of how trade is impacted. In the third
column, the full empirical model is tested, with exports regressed on distance and risk measures.
The coefficients of distance and the risk measures are significant with distance being negatively
correlated, the exporting country’s measure of the risk being positively correlated and the risk
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measure of the trading partner being negatively correlated (and now statistically significant at the
5% level). These findings imply that, an increase in the distance between trading partners
decreases, consistent with the traditional gravity model. I however add that an increase in a
country’s own measure of risk, increases its exports, while an increase in a trading partners risk
measure decreases exports to that country. Keeping in mind that an increase in the risk measure
implies a less risky partner, the last result seems contradictory at first glance. To resolve this
contradiction, it is prudent to analyze what happens when a trading partner becomes less risky.
Suppose country A is the exporting country and Country B is the importing country. If the increase
in the risk measure of country B causes it to become much less risky than country A, from country
B’s point of view, it would seek out a less risky country to trade with, thus reducing the imports
from country A (which will be country A’s exports to B). This will manifest as a decline in exports
from country A to country B as a result of country B becoming less risky, as is observed in the
empirical findings.
2.3.2 Introducing country pair risk measures
The observation above suggests that the changes in individual risk measures alone cannot fully
account for changes in trade patterns, but a more relative risk measure is called for, i.e. the changes
in the risk measure of country A relative to country B. To account for this, a new interaction term;

relriskij is introduced to equation 1 to yield the following;
expijt  0  1GDP expit  2GDPpart jt  3distij  4risk expit  5riskpart jt  6 relriskijt

7contigij  8comlangij  9comcolij  10col 45ij  11colonyij  12curcolij   ijt
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(22)

Table 15: Regression results of Export value on Distance and Risk Measures

Ln GDP of
Exporter
Ln GDP of
Partner
Ln Distance

(1)
1.410***
(0.000)
1.051***
(0.000)
-1.346***
(0.000)

(2)
1.403***
(0.000)
1.062***
(0.000)
0.00161***
(0.001)
-0.000625
(0.157)

Exporter
Risk
Partner
Risk
Relrisk

Ln Exports
(3)
(4)
1.405***
1.405***
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
1.054
1.054***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-1.346***
-1.346***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.00169***
0.00181***
(0.000)
(0.000)
**
-0.000992
-0.00124***
(0.020)
(0.004)
-0.00199***
(0.000)

Abrisk
comlang
col45
contig
comcol
curcol
colony
_cons
N

0.841***
(0.000)
1.119***
(0.000)
1.149***
(0.000)
1.330***
(0.000)
-3.091**
(0.021)
0.139
(0.335)
-34.45***
(0.000)
218946

1.048***
(0.000)
0.808***
(0.000)
3.809***
(0.000)
1.547***
(0.000)
-1.428
(0.266)
0.395**
(0.038)
-46.32***
(0.000)
218946

0.842***
(0.000)
1.119***
(0.000)
1.158***
(0.000)
1.330***
(0.000)
-3.094**
(0.021)
0.140
(0.330)
-34.43***
(0.000)
218946

0.842***
(0.000)
1.119***
(0.000)
1.154***
(0.000)
1.329***
(0.000)
-3.097**
(0.021)
0.140
(0.332)
-34.41***
(0.000)
218789

(5)
1.405***
(0.000)
1.054***
(0.000)
-1.344***
(0.000)
0.00171***
(0.000)
-0.00103**
(0.016)

(6)
1.410***
(0.000)
1.051***
(0.000)
-1.345***
(0.000)

-0.00140***
(0.001)
0.843***
(0.000)
1.123***
(0.000)
1.145***
(0.000)
1.327***
(0.000)
-3.100**
(0.020)
0.133
(0.355)
-34.38***
(0.000)
218946

-0.00136***
(0.001)
0.842***
(0.000)
1.123***
(0.000)
1.138***
(0.000)
1.327***
(0.000)
-3.096**
(0.020)
0.132
(0.360)
-34.41***
(0.000)
218946

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equations 21 and 22 using random effects estimation procedure
See appendix for a description of the indicator variables “Col45”, “Comcol”, and “Curcol”.
“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings
N is the number of data points used in each column.

Where relriskij  risk exp , is the ratio of the risk measures of both trading partners, and everything
riskpart

else is defined as above. Column 4 in Table 15 above summarizes the regression results based on
equation 22.
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Column 4 from Table 15 above shows a greater statistical significance of the risk factors on trade
flows as all three risk measures are now statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of
the risk interaction term itself is negative. This suggests that a general increase in the relative risk
rating of the trade partners i.e. either a relative increase in the exporting country’s rating or a
relative decrease in the importing country’s rating, implies a decrease in trade flows between them.
Specifically, I examine the total impact of a change in each partner’s risk measure on the value of
exports the exporting country sends to the partner.
First, the total impact of a change in the exporting country’s risk rating on the export value is
examined. This change given as

6
 exp
 4 
depends on the risk rating of the
risk exp
riskpart j

partner country alone. For an increase in the exporting country’s risk measure to lead to an increase
in the exports to a partner country,  4 

6
6
 0 . This implies that riskpart j   . This
4
riskpart j

suggests that there exists a certain threshold level of a partner’s risk measure below which, an
increase in the risk measure of the exporting country leads to a decrease in trade flows and above
which, leads to an increase in trade flows. This threshold level in the sample of countries studied
is 1.09932. This implies that for trading partners who are ranked below 1.099 (which according to
the measure of risk used implies very risky trading partners), an increase in the exporting country’s
risk measure will lead to a decrease in exports to the partner country. For countries ranked above
1.099, an increase in the exporting country’s measure of risk will lead to an increase in exports to
that country.33

32

This risk measure only applies to Iraq between 2003 and 2007, Sudan between 2009 and 2001, and the entire
duration of study for Somalia
33
This figure will be different as it is dependent on the countries studied and the time period examined.
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Next, the total impact of a change in the partner country’s risk rating on the export value is
examined. This change given as

 risk expi
 exp
 5  6
. This implies that for an increase in
riskpart
riskpart 2j

a trading partner’s risk measure to lead to an increase in exports from the exporting country,
5 

 6 risk expi

 0 , which implies that risk expi  5 riskpart 2j . For the estimated data set, 5  0.623 . As
riskpart 2j
6
6

a result, an increase in a trading partner’s risk rank leads to an increase of exports from the
exporting country only if risk expi  0.623riskpart 2j . The existence of these threshold values
suggest that countries are stratified into groups, with positive trade growth only occurring within
each group and not across, ceteris paribus (perhaps with the exception of high value commodities,
like oil and precious metals).
2.3.3 Accounting for differences in partner risk rankings
The existence of the above threshold values also suggest that countries might be reluctant to trade
with partners that are below a particular risk rating. This might imply that countries ranked farther
apart might do less trade than countries ranked closer together. To test this likelihood, the
following regression is run

expijt  0  1GDP expit  2GDPpart jt  3distij  4risk expit  5riskpart jt  6abriskijt

7contigij  8comlangij  9comcolij  10col 45ij  11colonyij  12curcolij   ijt (23)
Where abrisk is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the risk ranking of the
trading partners and everything else is defined same above. This measure captures just how much
more risky a country is, compared to its trading partner. Column 5 in table 15 above summarizes
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the results of regression equation 3 and column 6 tests its robustness to the exclusion of the
individual risk measures.
In column 5 of table 15 above, there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between
the exports to a partner country and the difference in their risk rankings. This suggests that the
greater the difference in risk rankings of trading partners, the lower the trade flows between them.
This implies that countries ranked closer together according to their risk measure will tend to trade
more than countries ranked further apart. In light of the relationship established above in figure
16, this finding would mean that more developed countries would trade with other developed
countries as they are ranked similarly, while the developing countries would only have each other
with whom to trade. This implies that the assumption of the role of risk in trade lowering potential
growth and development of countries might be valid and is something that deserves a closer look.
2.3.4 Robustness checks
There are two potential arguments that could be levied against the results thus far. The first is that
the analysis has at yet, not accounted for the relationship between “within country” or internal
trade and external trade. The classic argument resulting from the fact that the larger the economy,
the more the internal trade is carried out in opposition to external trade, suggesting a negative
correlation between internal trade measures and exports. This issue is addressed by Frankel and
Romer (1999) who suggest that the size of internal trade can be instrumented for by the size of the
population or the geographical area of the country. I adopt this methodology and test the robustness
of the previous estimates to the inclusion of internal trade. The second argument is that the risk
measure used in this analysis might be a reflection of the countries’ institutions and as such, can
be generalized beyond just risk, but as the effect of the institutions in general on trade. To test this,
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I include other institutional measures of both partner countries and it is expected that the better the
institutional qualities the more trade is done suggesting a positive correlation between institutional
measures and exports. These measures - also provided by the world governance indicators - capture
corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. If this assertion is true, and the risk-trade
relationship established in the study so far is just the effect of institutions, then the inclusion of
these institutional measures should alter the coefficients estimated for the risk measures (resulting
in either a change in magnitude or reduction of significance), implying correlation between these
measures and the risk measures. Tables 16 and 17 below capture the results of these robustness
checks. Table 16 shows the results using the “abrisk” measure. The expected negative coefficients
for population and area are observed suggesting that increases in internal trade lead to less external
trade between partners. The inclusion of these internal trade proxies render the risk rankings
insignificant34 but the “abrisk” measure is still significant implying a robust risk-trade relationship.
All measures of institutions considered are positive and statistically significant as expected, but
only the robustness of the exporter country risk measure is affected, the measures of partner
country risk and “abrisk” remain significant. This, combined with the fact that the signs of these
institutional variables are in opposition to those of risk, suggest that the mechanism through which
risk affects trade is different from the other measures of institutions. This demonstrates that the
risk-trade relationship is not just a reflection of the levels of institution.

34

When area is introduced, partner country risk is still significant but export country risk is insignificant.
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Table 16: Robustness checks (with “abrisk” measures)

Ln GDP of
Exporter
Ln GDP of
Partner
Ln Distance
Exporter
Risk
Partner
Risk
Abrisk
Ln population
Exporter
Ln population
Partner
Ln area
Exporter
Ln area
Partner
Corruption of
exporter
Corruption of
partner
Gov. effectiveness
Exporter
Gov. effectiveness
Partner
Rule of Law
Exporter
Rule of Law
Partner
Constant
N

(1)
1.436***
(0.000)
1.043***
(0.000)
-1.340***
(0.000)
0.000917
(0.103)
-0.000791
(0.117)
-0.00142***
(0.001)
-0.0556***
(0.000)
0.0155
(0.272)

Ln Exports
(3)
1.396***
(0.000)
1.045***
(0.000)
-1.332***
(0.000)
-0.0000382
(0.945)
-0.00171***
(0.001)
-0.00147***
(0.000)

(2)
1.436***
(0.000)
1.079***
(0.000)
-1.319***
(0.000)
0.000553
(0.277)
-0.00194***
(0.000)
-0.00149***
(0.000)

(4)
1.378***
(0.000)
1.047***
(0.000)
-1.332***
(0.000)
-0.000504
(0.361)
-0.00142***
(0.004)
-0.00146***
(0.001)

(5)
1.376***
(0.000)
1.038***
(0.000)
-1.322***
(0.000)
-0.00165***
(0.006)
-0.00232***
(0.000)
-0.00141***
(0.001)

-0.0780***
(0.000)
-0.0663***
(0.000)
0.00441***
(0.000)
0.00185***
(0.001)
0.00641***
(0.000)
0.00132**
(0.042)

-34.24***
(0.000)
218946

-34.18***
(0.000)
218946

-34.25***
(0.000)
214279

-33.95***
(0.000)
214279

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equation 23 using random effects estimation procedure
Full specification of equation 23 was estimated but only the relevant variables were reported
“Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings
N is the number of data points used in each column
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0.00821***
(0.000)
0.00337***
(0.000)
-33.83***
(0.000)
214279

Table 17: Robustness checks (with “relrisk” measures)

Ln GDP of
Exporter
Ln GDP of
Partner
Ln Distance
Exporter
Risk
Partner
Risk
Relrisk
Ln population
Exporter
Ln population
Partner
Ln area
Exporter
Ln area
Partner
Corruption of
exporter
Corruption of
partner
Gov. effectiveness
Exporter
Gov. effectiveness
Partner
Rule of Law
Exporter
Rule of Law

Partner
Constant
N

(1)
1.435***
(0.000)
1.043***
(0.000)
-1.342***
(0.000)
0.00103*
(0.067)
-0.000991*
(0.051)
-0.00198***
(0.000)
-0.0548***
(0.000)
0.0161
(0.253)

Ln Exports
(3)
1.396***
(0.000)
1.046***
(0.000)
-1.335***
(0.000)
0.0000716
(0.897)
-0.00190***
(0.000)
-0.00202***
(0.000)

(2)
1.436***
(0.000)
1.079***
(0.000)
-1.321***
(0.000)
0.000667
(0.191)
-0.00214***
(0.000)
-0.00199***
(0.000)

(4)
1.378***
(0.000)
1.049***
(0.000)
-1.335***
(0.000)
-0.000402
(0.468)
-0.00155***
(0.002)
-0.00198***
(0.000)

(5)
1.376***
(0.000)
1.038***
(0.000)
-1.324***
(0.000)
-0.00155**
(0.011)
-0.00249***
(0.000)
-0.00194***
(0.000)

-0.0775***
(0.000)
-0.0658***
(0.000)
0.00440***
(0.000)
0.00179***
(0.001)
0.00642***
(0.000)
0.00109*
(0.094)

-34.27***
(0.000)
218789

-34.21***
(0.000)
218789

-34.29***
(0.000)
214122

-34.00***
(0.000)
214122

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equation 22 using random effects estimation procedure
Full specification of equation 22 was estimated but only the relevant variables were reported
“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks
N is the number of data points used in each column
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0.00821***
(0.000)
0.00329***
(0.000)
-33.87***
(0.000)
214122

Table 17 above capture the same regressions with the “relrisk” measure have the same results as
observed in table 16.
2.3.5 Accounting for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Risk-Trade relationship
The time frame studied in this paper includes a period during which risk was a very prominent
issue at the forefront of international relations. Given the potential relationship between trade and
inter country financing established by Rose and Spiegel (2002), it stands to reason that this strong
statistical finding might have been influenced by the onset of the financial crisis in way of a
response of now very risk averse trading partners to the potential consequences of risk. This
necessitates an investigation into the pre-financial crisis relationship between trade flows and risk.
To this end, equation 1 is re-estimated for two subsets of the full sample; pre and post 2008 for the
same set of trading partnerships. Table 18 below captures the results of the regression from
equation one for both sub samples.
The even numbered columns in table 18 below correspond to the post crisis subsample while the
odd numbers correspond to the pre-crisis subsample. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the traditional
gravity model for both subsamples again confirming that each subsample provides similar results
to the full sample and other works in the literature. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the gravity model
with the risk measures alone. Here, I find a positive and statistically significant relationship
between exports and the risk measure of the exporting country for both the pre and post financial
crisis, as was the case for the full sample. The magnitude of the relationship however doubled after
the onset of the financial crisis, implying that there was a higher response to risk after the onset of
the financial crisis. The relationship between the exports and the risk measure of the partner
country makes an even stronger case in support of this point. The pre-crisis coefficient was
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statistically insignificant, while the post crisis coefficient is negative and statistically significant at
the 5% level, similar to the findings in the full sample. Columns 5 and 6 which capture the results
of regression with both distance and risk measures, shows the same increase from the pre-crisis to
the post crisis periods.
Table 18: Effect of financial crisis on the Risk-Trade relationship (“relrisk and “abrisk” excluded)35

Ln GDP of
Exporter
Ln GDP of
Partner
Distance
Exporter
Risk
Partner
Risk
comlang
col45
contig
comcol
curcol
colony
Constant

N

Pre-crisis
1.349***
(0.000)
0.987***
(0.000)
-1.302***
(0.000)

0.787***
(0.000)
1.111***
(0.000)
1.181***
(0.000)
1.246***
(0.000)
-2.751**
(0.018)
0.363***
(0.004)
-31.78***
(0.000)
106174

Post-crisis
1.378***
(0.000)
0.977***
(0.000)
-1.355***
(0.000)

0.756***
(0.000)
0.954***
(0.000)
1.202***
(0.000)
1.278***
(0.000)
-3.305**
(0.025)
0.346**
(0.019)
-31.69***
(0.000)
112772

Exports
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
***
1.334
1.346***
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
0.986
0.973***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.00256***
(0.000)
0.000239
(0.608)
0.973***
(0.000)
0.800***
(0.000)
3.752***
(0.000)
1.467***
(0.000)
-1.171
(0.279)
0.632***
(0.000)
-42.82***
(0.000)
106174

0.00595***
(0.000)
-0.00113**
(0.029)
0.942***
(0.000)
0.611***
(0.007)
3.896***
(0.000)
1.511***
(0.000)
-1.648
(0.255)
0.673***
(0.000)
-42.82***
(0.000)
112772

Pre-crisis
1.343***
(0.000)
0.989***
(0.000)
-1.299***
(0.000)
0.00242***
(0.000)
-0.000340
(0.445)
0.790***
(0.000)
1.112***
(0.000)
1.205***
(0.000)
1.250***
(0.000)
-2.764**
(0.017)
0.363***
(0.004)
-31.80***
(0.000)
106174

Post-crisis
1.363***
(0.000)
0.984***
(0.000)
-1.352***
(0.000)
0.00566***
(0.000)
-0.00187***
(0.000)
0.759***
(0.000)
0.953***
(0.000)
1.240***
(0.000)
1.282***
(0.000)
-3.322**
(0.025)
0.348**
(0.018)
-31.71***
(0.000)
112772

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equation 21 using random effects estimation procedure
See appendix for a description of the indicator variables “Col45”, “Comcol”, and “Curcol”.
N is the number of data points used in each column.

35

Pre and post crisis periods are estimated for the same country pairs. The difference in the number of observations
N is due to data limitations for the pre-crisis periods
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Table 19 below shows the effect of the financial crisis on the trade-risk relationship paying
particular attention to the effect of the “relrisk” and the “abrisk” measures. Columns 1 and 2 in
the table show the effect from the inclusion of the relative risk measure. I still observe the same
pattern of increase in the individual risk measures, but find no statistical relevance of the relative
risk measure in the post crisis period. This suggests that the threshold which might have existed in
the pre-crisis period has been eliminated in the post crisis period, implying the elimination of the
restrictions placed on existing and perhaps new trading partners. Columns 3 and 4 in the table 19
show the effect from the inclusion of the “abrisk” measure36. Here, I do not observe a difference
between the pre and post crisis periods, suggesting that countries that are farther apart with regard
to their risk ranking still tend to trade less with each other. A combination of these two findings
suggests that while countries in the post crisis period might be willing to alter their trading
agreements as a result of higher aversion to fluctuating risk levels, they are still wary of the risk
rating of potential trade partners, and are risk averse enough to still consider trading partners with
similar risk measures for new partnerships.
2.3.5: Model Performance tests
Figures 1 to 18 in the appendix that follows this chapter show different graphical representations
corresponding to different country pairs, comparing different fitted data to the actual bilateral trade
data to determine which model fits the observed data better. The observed data (labeled “lnexp”)
is compared to predictions based on the standard gravity model featuring the distance measure
alone (“model 1”), an augmented version of the gravity model with risk measures alone (“model
2”) and finally, a combination of both models 1 and 2 featuring risk and distance measures together

Columns 5 and 6 of table 3 show that the “abrisk” measures for both the pre and post crisis periods respectively
are robust to the exclusion of the individual risk measures
36
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(“model 3”). It is clear to see that the combination of risk and distance measures does a better job
of explaining the actual bilateral trade flows than either measure alone, which validates the
empirical findings. It should be noted however that certain country pairs’ bilateral trade is better
predicted using risk measures alone (United States and Afghanistan, United States and Barbados,
Russia and Iraq, Hong Kong and United States, China Mainland and the United States and Nigeria
and Cameroon). This could be either because some countries are already putting more weight on
risk measures over distance or that the farther away the trading partner; the more emphasis is
placed on risk. A comparison across the different country pairs seems to mostly suggest the latter.
The “take away” from the graphs in the appendix is that risk definitely has a role to play in
determining the extent of bilateral trade.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, the role of risk in international bilateral trade is empirically tested and subsequently
verified. There is evidence that suggests that the riskier a trading partner, the less likely it is for
trade to occur. It is also found that a combination of distance and risk measures provide a better
explanation of trade decisions than either variable alone. Despite this, there is reason to believe
that these estimates for the relevance of risk is understated, as the empirical model used in this
paper considers only one exogenous source of risk37. Other sources of risk not captured in the
analysis include, but are not limited to; measures of risk associated with financial stability and
production shocks, exchange rate volatility and currency misalignment, which are most likely to
increase the relevance of risk in bilateral trade in the same direction with riskier countries trading
less than their less risky counterparts.

37

The political stability of a country and the absence of violence and terrorism
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Table 19: Effect of financial crisis on the Risk-Trade relationship (“relrisk” and “abrisk” included)

Ln GDP of
Exporter
Ln GDP of
Partner
Distance
Exporter
Risk
Partner
Risk
Relrisk

Pre-crisis
1.343***
(0.000)
0.990***
(0.000)
-1.299***
(0.000)
0.00254***
(0.000)
-0.000590
(0.197)
-0.00198**
(0.017)

Post-crisis
1.363***
(0.000)
0.984***
(0.000)
-1.352***
(0.000)
0.00571***
(0.000)
-0.00195***
(0.000)
-0.000806
(0.168)

Abrisk
comlang
col45
contig
comcol
curcol
colony
_cons

N

0.791***
(0.000)
1.112***
(0.000)
1.202***
(0.000)
1.249***
(0.000)
-2.766**
(0.017)
0.361***
(0.005)
-31.81***
(0.000)
106017

0.760***
(0.000)
0.954***
(0.000)
1.239***
(0.000)
1.282***
(0.000)
-3.323**
(0.025)
0.347**
(0.019)
-31.71***
(0.000)
112772

Ln Exports
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
***
1.343
1.364***
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
0.990
0.986***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-1.294***
-1.349***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.00256*** 0.00567***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.000290 -0.00194***
(0.513)
(0.000)

Pre-crisis
1.350***
(0.000)
0.988***
(0.000)
-1.297***
(0.000)

Post-crisis
1.379***
(0.000)
0.978***
(0.000)
-1.352***
(0.000)

-0.00273*** -0.00273*** -0.00261*** -0.00267***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
***
***
0.792
0.763
0.789
0.760***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
***
***
1.119
0.965
1.117
0.965***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
***
***
1.185
1.213
1.159
1.175***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
***
***
***
1.246
1.279
1.243
1.276***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
**
**
**
-2.792
-3.321
-2.776
-3.304**
(0.015)
(0.024)
(0.016)
(0.024)
0.346***
0.326**
0.347***
0.325**
(0.007)
(0.027)
(0.006)
(0.027)
-31.77***
-31.70***
-31.74***
-31.68***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
106174
112772
106174
112772

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equations 22 and 23 using random effects estimation procedure
See appendix for a description of the indicator variables “Col45”, “Comcol”, and “Curcol”.
“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings
N is the number of data points used in each column.

These factors were omitted due to endogeneity issues in the empirical analysis. Finally, an attempt
is made to highlight the effect of the onset of the financial crisis on the risk-bilateral trade
relationship. From the results of the analysis, there is evidence to suggest that while risk had a
significant role to play in determining trade flows before the onset of the financial crisis of 2008
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and has become even more important. The persistence of distance as a determinant of trade flows
over the years should not be underestimated either. Distance is no longer just a measure of the
difference in spatial coordinates or a proxy for transportation costs with respect to international
trade. Distance also represents trading agreements and partnerships that where initially formed
when physical distance was much more of a barrier to trade, and these partnerships still persist to
this day. Distance also has a risk component via insurance costs of transportation. It could be
argued that the farther the distance between trading partners, the more likely the loss of the goods
being transported and as such, the higher the cost to insure the goods during transport. Both these
points offer explanations as to why distance is still a valid component in determining trade flows.
A potential significance of the risk measure on the growth rate of an economy through the avenue
of trade is also highlighted. It is found that there is a threshold country risk measures that determine
the pattern of trade flows between partners. This is because the countries prefer to trade with a
partner as safe, if not safer. The effect of the difference between trade partners risk ranking on
trade flows is also tested, and it is found that the larger the difference in risk rankings, the lower
the trade flows. These two results point to the fact that countries will tend to do more trade with
other countries of similar risk measures. This provides an alternative explanation as to why similar
countries engage in trade as opposed to the theory of similar production capacities. This ultimately
suggests that the risk measure of developing countries could potentially dissuade growth
enhancing trade opportunities with more developed countries, accounting for part of the continued
discrepancy between developed and developing countries.
In conclusion, in the event of “true” globalization, economists would have to update their thinking
about factors that influence bilateral trade. This will completely render the concept of borders null
and void, and as a result, will completely restructure the very basis for choice in international
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trading partners. The growth of technology and current work being done by scientists in the area
of information dissemination and 3-D printing which indicate that transportation costs will soon
become independent of distance, seems to suggest that while this future is far off, it is more likely
every day and with the advent of these developments, economists would do well to come up with
better predictors of bilateral trade as distance will no longer offer any information about trade, but
a country’s idiosyncratic risk measure most definitely will.
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Appendix 2.1:
Table B: Data description and source
Variable
Bilateral
Exports
Total Exports

Distance

Description
Value of total exports from
a country to each trading
partner
Value of total exports from
a country

Arial distance
trading pairs

between

GDP

Gross Domestic Product of
each Country

Risk Measure

Political stability of the
Governments
and
the
presence of terrorism in
each country

HDI Ranking

Human development index
ranking
countries
in
descending order from most
developed
to
least
developed
0 if no common language
and 1 if both countries in a
pair speak the same
language
1 if both countries share a
border and 0 if they do not

Common
language

Contiguous

Col45

1 if both countries have had
a colonial relationship after
1945 and 0 if they do night

Comcol

1 if both countries have
been colonized by the same
country and 0 if they do not.

Curcol

1 if trading partners are
currently in a colonial
relationship 0 otherwise

Source
International Monetary Fund Database.
data.imf.org
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators
United Nations Development Program
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-developmentindex-hdi
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
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Table 2.1 cont.
Variable
colony

Population

Area

Rule of Law

Corruption

Government
effectiveness

Description
Source
1 if one country in a pair French Research Center in International Economics
was colonized by the other, http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
and 0 otherwise
asp?id=8
Number of people in each World Bank World development indicators
country
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
Surface area is a country's World Bank World development indicators
total area, including areas http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
under inland bodies of water ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentand some coastal waterways indicators
Rule
of
Law captures World Bank World Governance Indicators
perceptions of the extent to http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governancesociety, and in particular the indicators
quality
of
contract
enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime
and violence
Control of Corruption captures
perceptions of the extent to
which public power is
exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as
"capture" of the state by elites
and private interests
Government
Effectiveness
captures perceptions of the
quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the
credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies

World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators

World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators
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Appendix 2.2
For Figures 1 through 18, “lnexp” is the actual data of value of exports between partner countries,
“Model 1” is the predicted export using distance measures alone, “Model 2” is the predicted
measure using Risk measures alone and “Model 3” is the predicted export using a combination of
distance and risk measures.
Figure 1: Sri-Lankan Exports to Bangladesh

Figure 2: United States’ Exports to Afghanistan

Figure 3: United States’ exports to Armenia

Figure 4: United States’ exports to Barbados

Figure 5: United states’ Exports to Botswana

Figure 6: United States’ exports to Nigeria
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Figure 7: Nigeria’s exports to Cameroon

Figure 8: Luxembourg’s Exports to Canada

Figure 9: Russia’s exports to Iran

Figure 10: Russia’s exports to Iraq

Figure 11: United States’ exports to Iran

Figure 12: United states’ exports to Iraq
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Figure 13: Hong Kong’s exports to the US

Figure 15: China Mainland’s exports to the US

Figure 17: United States’ exports to Macao

Figure 14: Macao’s exports to the US

Figure 16: United states’ exports to Hong Kong

Figure 18: United States’ exports to china mainland
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Chapter 3
The Path from Risk to Growth, through Trade
3.1 Introduction
The role of risk in international economic relations has been at the forefront of many studies in
recent times due in large part to the fallout from the most recent financial crisis. While the majority
of these studies focus on the effect of risk on growth through the channel of international finance,
the effect of risk on growth via international trade flows has been largely neglected, especially
given the role of trade in propagating systemic risk during the crisis of 2008. This paper thus
focuses on the effect of risk on growth through this trade nexus. The precedence for such a study
has been set in the literature by others that have evaluated the influence of different types of risks
on bilateral trade. These include measures of risk such as political risk defined by policy
uncertainty38 (Anderson and Marcoullier, 2002; Oh and Reuveny, 2010), political instability
defined by regime instability and presence of terrorism (chapter two)39 or volatility from exchange
rate fluctuations as in Thursby and Thursby (1987) and Broll and Eckwert (1999)40. Admittedly,
risk can be both the cause and the effect. To avoid circularity of the cause and effect, I focus on
“exogenous risks”, particularly, the measure of risk suggested in chapter 2 which is a measure of
political instability and the presence of terrorism in a country. This may be justified due to the
unlikely possibility of reverse causality between growth and this risk measure41.

38

Specifically, risk associated with policies that affect successful business practices (trade) captured through survey
indicators on contract enforcement, impartiality and transparency of Economic policies, police quality, and crime
and resolution of disputes locally (Oh and Reuveny, 2010)
39
For a more thorough review on other measures on risk in trade see chapter 2
40
The literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility is vast. For a concise summary see McKenzie (1999)
41
I acknowledge the sociological argument that a low growth environment may produce political instability or
terrorism. But to date, no rigorous empirical study has been able to demonstrate this link and anecdotal evidence
seems to suggest increases in inequality is the more likely culprit that triggers social unrest as opposed to general
growth decline. Furthermore, the components of this measure such as frequency of disappearances, politically
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These findings suggest that due to the impact of risk on trade flows, the contribution of trade to
growth may have been incorrectly estimated. In addition, when risk has been used in growth
regressions and the results been attributed to the contribution of risk through the finance nexus,
the contribution of risk to trade has inadvertently been attributed to finance, possibly
overestimating the deleterious effects of finance on growth. The comparative effect of the financial
impact to trade impact during the financial crisis highlighted in chapter one, seems to point to this
conclusion as well. This study therefore examines the role of trade on growth accounting for the
difference in its effect in the absence and presence of risk, with the aim of accounting for the role
of risk on growth, through the trade nexus. A secondary consequence of my study is its contribution
to the debate as to the efficiency of outward oriented trade policies on growth. With the fact that
risk is a factor in trade flow determination, outward oriented policies alone cannot promote growth;
they have to be supported by stabilization policies, which in turn generates more trade.
The relevance of this study cannot be overstated due to the well-known relationship between trade
and growth. It has been suggested that trade contributes to growth either through capital
accumulation or its effect on innovation and technological spill over (Lopez, 2005). Theoretically,
Santacreu (2015) proposes that trade enters growth via research and development increasing the
chance of success and leading to higher output. Trade is estimated to be responsible for about 65%
of the increase in growth in developing countries. Empirically, increased output has been shown
to be a direct result of trade in technology through increased domestic innovation (Schneider,
2005). It therefore stands to reason that factors that impact trade should also impact growth. To
this end, I model the impact of the exogenous determinants of trade (distance and risk) on growth

motivated assassinations and ethnic conflicts reinforce the one-way causality from this measure to growth, as growth
is not a sufficient condition for these outcomes.
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and empirically test their validity. While a broader definition of risk spans a variety of sources of
uncertainty in the delivery of previously agreed amount of goods, the problem of reverse causality
suggests that this definition of risk be limited to more exogenous variables indicating that the
estimates generated in this study are lower bounds. In this paper, political instability and the
presence of terrorism in import partner countries are used as exogenous sources of risk stemming
from a supply shocks. In addition, I also consider risk factors associated with the export partner’s
demand (e.g., demand fluctuations measured by their risk ratings and their previous period’s
growth rate) and determine their effect on growth rates of the country of concern.42
An overview of the literature indicates some ambivalence on the impact of trade on growth. For
example, Lopez’s (2005) extensive review of the literature suggests a mixed record of success in
trade promoting policies. One explanation for this, under the purview of the “new new” trade
theory, is that the impact of trade on growth can have both pro and anti-growth effects when
considering heterogeneous firms (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008). On a more macroeconomic
level which is more in line with this study, the arguments for the mixed growth performance of
countries engaged in trade promotion can be split into two primary camps: the first is that success
is due to macroeconomic stability (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999); the second suggests that a
commitment to outward-oriented policies, rather than macroeconomic stability drives the success
of these countries (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002).43 The approach in this paper is, however,
more in line with Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) that macroeconomic stability determines the

42

While political instability and terrorism are likely to be generally exogenous to trade and growth, demand driven
risk factors may or may not be independent of factors contributing to growth in the primary country of concern, for
example, if they are associated with systemic factors such as global slowdown. In the empirical section, I address this
issue by introducing time fixed effects to capture the economic downturn of 2008.
43

See also Kreuger (1990) who viewed the success stories in East Asia as solely due to a shift in trade strategy to
outward-oriented policies in these countries.
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success of outward – oriented trade policies. In chapter 2, I empirically show that countries selfselect themselves into strata based on political stability and terrorism rankings and as such, tend
to trade more with countries that have similar levels of stability. This suggests that the success of
outward oriented policies may only serve to increase trade flows as long as the trading partner is
less risky (more macro-economically stable by the standards of any of the risk measures discussed
earlier).
This introduction of risk also casts doubt on the solutions that have been suggested to help
developing countries grow faster through trade. For example, once risk is allowed in, it is no longer
clear whether a reduction of trade barriers in advanced countries would expand imports from the
developing countries. Rather, such a policy is likely to mainly increase trade among advanced
economies primarily due to the risk factor posed by their developing counterparts which acts as a
deterrent to increased trade flows. Therefore, policy makers in these risky countries will need to
take this into account when formulating plans designed to promote growth through trade. What
follows is therefore a rigorous analysis to both theoretically and empirically provide evidence to
support this assertion.
To address these questions, I model a dynamic trade relationship in which a particular country
engages in trade with multiple partners. The country first imports capital goods from its trading
partners and uses them in the production process. It then consumes, saves and exports from said
output. I make the added assumption that the capital imports augment the local capital, which
implies that the higher the capital imports, the higher the output. This is in line with HallwardDriemeier et. al (2002) who find that increase in imports of capital goods led to productivity gains
in a dataset of five Asian countries. I also account for the role of export growth on economic
growth, both through the balanced trade assumption and potential externalities leading to increase
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in technology that ultimately enhances growth. In this paper, the volume of trade however, depends
not only on traditional factors that impact trade, such as output and distance, but also on measures
of risk. Distance is modelled in the traditional sense, with an increase in distance implying an
increase in transportation costs ultimately leading to less trade.
Empirically, this study draws inspiration from Frankel and Romer (1998) from here on FR, who
estimate a country’s bilateral trade using the geographical measures in the gravity model
(excluding GDP of both partners due to reverse causality between GDP and growth) and then
aggregate the estimated bilateral trade estimates for each country over all the partners to obtain an
exogenous measure of trade (exogenous to the growth rate). Here, I follow the same process but
estimate this for a panel dataset as opposed to the cross sectional dataset by FR, this is because
cross country empirical studies are not robust and offer no evolving mechanism by which trade
affects growth (Lopez, 2005). As a result, I opt for a panel data set as the time series component
provides that added dimensionality (Dollar and Kraay, 2003). I extend the FR paper by adding the
risk measure to the individual estimates of trade of both partners before aggregating and obtaining
the estimates of trade. The study proposes to highlight the difference (if any) that the inclusion of
risk in trade may have on the impact of trade on growth. It does so, by comparing both models
(with and without the risk measure) for the same set of countries for the same time period.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two discusses the theoretical set up and
validation of my premise, as well as the consequences I intend to test empirically. Section 3
discusses the data, empirical analysis and results, while section four concludes.
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3.2 Theoretical Validation
3.2.1 The standard Model
Consider the following open production economy, infinite horizon, representative agent model.
For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, I assume no population growth and no
depreciation. Agents maximize lifetime utility by choosing consumption and savings over time. In
addition, they also import capital goods (raw materials) which are used to augment the production
process. The country incurs transportation cost of  , which is defined as an average cost per unit
per distance of transporting goods, i.e. it costs  to transport one unit of an import good one unit
of the distance travelled, so to transport j units across k miles, the total cost to the importing country
will be  kj. This is analogous to the iceberg shipping cost assumption that relates greater distance
to greater transportation costs. Importers then make contractual agreements based on future
expected export revenues. Given the incompleteness of capital markets however, particularly those
in less developed countries where such forms of risk are predominant, it is often not possible to
hedge such risks. This is compounded by the unexpected nature of the events, such as terrorism or
social unrest which will potentially cause trading partners to be cautious when entering into
contracts and as such, the potential for contract cancellation is factored into this analysis.
The agents in this economy choose the volume of imports to purchase from their import trading
partners, and a possibility that this contract is not upheld is accounted for. The weight assigned to
each trading partner that represents the belief of the agents in the country of concern that the
contract is upheld by the partner (between 0 and 1) is modelled as a function of the trading partner’s
risk measure such that, the riskier a trading partner, the lower the weight assigned to the receipt of
imports. On the demand side, the exporting agents also face the same threat of contract failure and
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assigns weights to the export trading partners based on their risk rating as well. As such, the
weights assigned have the following properties
0   j  R j  , k '  Rk   1, such that  j '  R j   0 and k '  Rk   0

(24)

 and  are weights assigned to import and export partners respectively, indicating the potential
for a negative unexpected shock. As a result, agents in this country enter into contracts expecting
that the contractual volume of trade will be met (i.e.  i = i =1) but plan for unexpected shocks (the
possibility that i  1 , i  1 ) when deciding the extent of trade with each partner country, given

passed behavior. The closer the weight assigned to a country is to 1, the more trade with that
country44.
R is the risk rating of import partner j and export partner k.
This implies that observed imports at time t is

M t   j  R j  m j 1   d j   t  R  C  D M  mt
j

Where

M t is the observed imported capital at time t

 j is the weight assigned to partner country j
R j is the risk rating of risk partner j

 is the transportation cost

44
45

In essence, agents will engage in trade if E ( )  E ( )  1
See appendix for proof of aggregation
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(25)45

d j is the distance between the importing country and trading partner j

t  R  is the aggregated weight assigned to all import trading partners such that t '  R   0
mt is total imports at time t specified by contract

D M is the sum of distances between country i and all J import trading partners
C  D M   N M   D M 46is the fraction remaining after transportation costs are deducted from all
M
import partners such that C '  D M   0 , and N is the number of import trading partners

Implying that

ktF
ktF
and

0
0
D M
R

(26)

Similarly, Observed exports at time t is given as

X t  t  R  C  D X  xt

(27)

Where t  R  is aggregated weight assigned to all export trading partners such that t '  R   0

D X is the sum of distances between country i and all K export trading partners
And xt is the total export at time t specified by contract

This also implies that

X t
X t
0
 0 and
X
R
D

(28)

This implies that the production function is of the form
f  ktD , M t

46



(29)

See appendix
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Where ktD and M t are domestic and imported capital respectively

Given the well-established “benefits from trade” argument and the consequence of specialization
that is inherent within it, it is reasonable to expect countries to specialize in the production of
capital goods for which they have comparative advantage and import those which they do not,
making the relationship complementary in the production process. As a result, I make the
following assumptions about the production function
f1  ktD , M t   0

(30)

f11  ktD , M t   0

(31)

f 2  ktD , M t   0

(32)

f12  ktD , M t   0

(33)

where subscripts 1 and 2 indicate partial derivatives with respect to the first and second arguments
respectively.
Equations 7 and 8 highlight the usual assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital.
Equation 9 shows the positive role of adding imported capital goods to augment production.
Equation 10 captures the benefit of trade to the returns to capital, due to the fact that these imported
capital goods improve productivity predicated on the complementarity assumption47. With these

47

This is in line with previous studies in the literature, particularly Lee (1995) and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008)
who suggest that importing intermediate (capital) goods lead to higher productivity.
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specified, output in period t, is allocated to consumption, investment and the rest is intended for
the contractual exports, thus the budget constraint is given below48

f  ktD , M t   ktD1  ktD  ct  X t 1

(34)

where, ct is consumption at time t, X t 1 is observed exports. The weights assigned to each trading
partner are based on previous behavior and is known at time t, and as such, the agents choose the
import and export contract volume, given these weights, resulting in a deterministic production
function49.

Since the timing adopted in this study implies that imports take place before exports and as such
is observable before the export decision is made, the balanced trade assumption introduced in this
study implies that observed imports are equivalent to the expected exports, i.e.
mt  X t 1

(35)

Which implies that M t  t  R  t  R  C  D M  C  D X  xt 1

(36)



Therefore, agents in this economy maximize expected lifetime utility50

  u  c  subject
t

t 0

t

equations (27), (34) and (36)

48
49

All variables in per capita terms
The expectation of observed imports and exports are equal to the contractual agreements, i.e. E ( M t )  mt and

E ( X t 1 )  xt 1 . Therefore, making the decision of how much to trade using the belief that the contract will be
upheld, only serves to limit trade with riskier trading partners with a higher probability of experiencing a negative
shock.
50
With the utility function satisfying the usual assumptions of concavity and Inada conditions
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to

Next, I solve the intertemporal problem

L  max
D

ct , kt 1 , xt 1





t

t 0

u c     f  k
t

t

D
t



, M t  xt 1    ct  ktD1  ktD  X t 1  xt 1 

(37)

First order conditions

L
 0  u '  ct   t  0
ct

(38)

L
 0  t  t 1  f1 ktD1 , M t 1  1
D
kt 1

(39)

L
 0  1  f 2  ktD , M t  t  R  C  D M 
xt 1

(40)





From equation 17
f 2  ktD , M t  

1
t  R  C  D M 

(41)

From equations 38 and 39
u '  ct 
   f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1
u '  ct 1 

Suppose u  ct   ln ct  u '  ct  

(42)

1
1
, equation 19 is resolved to yield the growth rate
, u '  ct 1  
ct
ct 1

of the economy g  c 

g c 

ct 1  ct
   f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1  1
ct

(43)
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This implies that the effect of a change in risk or distance on growth rates is given by the following
equations
g (c)
  f12  ktD1 , M t 1  t  R   t  R  xt 1 C  D M  C '  D X   C '  D M  C  D X   0
D

(44)

g (c)
  f12  ktD1 , M t 1  C  D M  C  D X  xt 1 t  R   t '  R   t '  R   t  R    0
R

(45)





Equations 21 and 22 above suggest that the determinants of trade have an effect on the growth rate
of an economy. Increases in the factors that deter trade negatively impact the rate of growth, further
highlighting the assertion that increase in trade is beneficial for growth. The fact that risk is shown
above to have an effect on the growth rate suggests that the effect of trade may have indeed been
incorrectly estimated in previous empirical studies.
3.2.2 Theoretical extension: Accounting for trade externalities
Due to the findings of positive spillover effects or externalities from trade51, I incorporate the
contribution of exports to productivity either through learning-by-doing or technological
externalities by introducing a function “g” of exports to the production function, such that, an
increase in exports leads to an increase in externalities ( g '  X   0 ), which ultimately increases
output. This implies that the production function is of the form
f  ktD , M t , g  X t  

(46)

Such that
f1  ktD , M t , g  X t    0

(47)

f11  ktD , M t , g  X t    0

(48)

f 2  ktD , M t , g  X t    0

(49)

f3  ktD , M t , g  X t    0

51

(50)

See Lopez (2005) for a detailed list of studies
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f12  ktD , M t , g  X t    0

(51)

f13  ktD , M t , g  X t    0

(52)

where subscripts 1, 2 and 3 indicate partial derivatives with respect to the first, second and third
arguments respectively.
Equations 47 and 48 once again highlight the usual diminishing returns to capital. Equations 49
and 50 show the benefit of adding imported capital goods to the production process as well as the
positive externalities from exports. Equations 51 and 52 capture the benefit of trade to the returns
to capital, due to the fact that these imported capital goods and externalities improve productivity.
Similar to the standard model above, agents in this economy maximize expected lifetime utility


  u  c  subject to the budget constraint f  k

D
t

t

t

t 0

, M t , g  X t    ktD1  ktD  ct  X t 1

This yields the following first order conditions

u '  ct   t  0

(53)

t  t 1  f1  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1    1

(54)

t 


X t 1
xt 1



t 1  f 2  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1  


M t 1
X 
 f3  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1   g '  X t 1  t 1 
xt 1
xt 1 

(55)

Equations 31 and 32 imply that
1

 X  
M
X 
 f1  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1    1   t 1   f 2  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1   t 1  f3  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1   g '  X t 1  t 1  (56)


xt 1
xt 1 
 xt 1  

Also assuming the same utility function
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g c 

ct 1  ct
   f1  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1    1  1
ct

(57)

This then implies that
M t 1
X
g (c)
  f12  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1  
  f13  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1   g '  X t 1  t X1  0
M
D
D
D

(58)

M t 1
X
g (c)
  f12  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1  
  f13  ktD1 , M t 1 , g  X t 1   g '  X t 1  t 1  0
R
R
R

(59)

Equations 58 and 59 show that the findings are robust to the inclusion of externalities form trade
as the same relationship is also obtained as in the standard model above.
In order to corroborate the theoretical hypothesis, I test for the potential error in estimating the
effect of trade on growth by looking at the effects of two trade instruments (one with risk and one
without) on the rate of growth.
3.3

Data and Methodology

3.3.1 Data
For the empirical analysis, I have annual data for 169 countries with 179 trading partners each,
between 2002 and 2013. The measure of import risk (supply side shocks) used is the measure of
political stability and absence of terrorist attacks of the importing partners, while the measure of
export risk (demand side shocks) is the measure of political stability and absence of terrorist of the
exporting partners as well as the lagged growth rate of the exporting partner countries. These
measures send signals to partner countries and they are able to make trade decisions given these
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parameters. Growth rates are measured typically as the annual percentage change in real GDP,
while trade share is the summation of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP52.
3.3.2 Methodology
Typically, when the question of the role of trade in growth is analyzed, an instrument is used in
place of actual trade flows due to the potential reverse causality between growth and trade. The
accuracy of this instrument to properly capture the effect of trade and yet side step the problem of
reverse causality is key to an accurate depiction of the role of trade on growth. In this study, I will
put the instrument into a weak and strong instrument test by considering two things: first is the
correlation between the instrument and trade flows and the second is the degree of exogeneity of
the variables that constitute my instruments. The analysis that follows is split into two stages: the
first stage predicts and subsequently selects appropriate instruments for trade flows53 using the
traditional gravity model as a starting point, while the second stage shows the effect of the selected
instruments on the rate of growth54.
3.3.2.1 Stage 1
Taking a page from FR, I generate estimates for trade flows using purely exogenous factors that
influence trade but are not influenced by growth rates. This implies that GDP levels are eliminated
from the standard gravity model, but my analysis differs from FR in that I add my exogenous
measures of risk to generate other instruments for trade. Furthermore, FR points out that

52

A full description of all variables used and sources can be found in the appendix
I use the test suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo. (2002) of an F-Statistic greater than 10 in the first stage
regression to judge the strength of the potential trade instruments
54
The fact that bilateral estimates (trade from country i to partner j at time t) are obtained in the first stage which are
then aggregated for use in the second stage (all trade from country i at time t) prohibits the use of standard IV
methods, where both stages are estimated together because the indexes do not match. Hence the two stage approach
that is taken here.
53
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international trade is influenced by the level of internal trading in each country and suggests that
the area of the country and the population within should be used as proxies to measure the level of
internal trade. As a result, I estimate the following equation:

ln tradeijt  0  1 ln distij  2 xriskit  3 prisk jt  4 gro jt 1  5 ln areait  6 ln area jt  7 ln popit
8 ln pop jt  9contigij  10comlangij  11comcolij  12col 45ij  13colonyij  14curcolij   ijt 55(60)

Where

tradeijt is the sum of country i’s exports and imports from its trading partner j at t
ln distij is the natural log of the distance between partner countries i and j
xriskit is the risk measure of the exporting country i at time t

prisk jt is the risk measure of partner country j at time t

gro jt 1 is the growth rate of partner country j at time t  1
ln areait is the natural log of the area of exporting country i at time t

ln area jt is the natural log of the area of partner country j at time t
ln popit is the natural log of the population of exporting country i at time t

ln pop jt is the natural log of the population of partner country j at time t

contigij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j are contiguous (share a border)

comlangij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j share a common language
comcolij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a common colonizer
after 1945

55

Other variations of this model are also estimated and the results are reported in section 3.3
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colonyij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have ever had a colonial

relationship

col 45ij is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a colonial relationship
after 1945

curcolij is a dummy variable indicating whether both countries are currently in a colonial
relationship
Estimates of trade flows for different variations of this model are then generated and used as
instruments for trade flows. Correlation coefficients are provided to determine how closely each
of these instruments matches the actual trade flow data.
3.3.2.2 Stage 2
In this stage, I use the estimates of trade flows with the highest correlation coefficients generated
in stage one as instruments of trade and determine the effect of the selected instruments (one with
risk measures and one without) on growth for the same set of countries and hence, determine the
more accurate effect of trade on growth. The inherent assumption that the degree of growth of
technology is in part dependent on the degree of trade in a country follows directly from the
theoretical model above (either through accumulation of capital imports or through technological
spillover) and is also in line with other works in the literature (Frimpong and Oteng-Abayie (2006)
and Lopez (2005)). So the standard output formula generally given as

Yit  At Kt Lt

(61)

Where K is capital stock, L is labor and At is the indicator for technology, can be extended to
introduce measures of trade and other potential factors that drive growth.
ln Yit  ln At   ln Kt   ln Lt

(62)

 ln Yit   ln At   ln Kt   ln Lt

(63)
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Where  ln Yit is the growth rate of countries i at time t
 ln At is the change in technology
 ln K t is investment
 ln Lt is change in labor

In this study, I use the rate of savings as a fraction of GDP as a proxy for investment and the change
in the total population as a proxy for the change in labor. Finally trade shares via At and as a result,
in stage two I run the following regression
groit   0   1 ln popt   2 savit   3 ln tsit  it

(64)

Where
groit is the growth rate of country i at time t
 ln popt is the population growth rate of country i at time t
savit is the savings rate of country i at time t
ln tsit is the natural log of the instrument of trade share of country i at time t

Finally, the average contribution of trade to growth over time, according to the selected
instruments of trade, is then estimated and compared to determine the differences between the
effects of the inclusion and exclusion of risk measures. The results of both stages are presented in
the following subsection.
3.3.3 Empirical results and analysis
3.3.3.1 Stage I results
The results for equation (60) are given in table 20 below. The expected signs for distance,
population and the area of each country are obtained and are robust to the inclusion of other
parameters in columns 1 through 6. Columns 1 and 2 highlight the importance of introducing the
109

exogenous measures of risk to the gravity model, as I find that both risk measures are statistically
significant with an increase in this particular measure of risk leading to an increase in trade flows.56
Columns 3 and 5 which include the measure of risk from demand side shocks suggest that the risk
rating of the exporting country i is more robust since its inclusion (column 3) renders the lag of
partner country j’s growth rate insignificant. Furthermore, the introduction of the “relrisk” and
“abrisk”57 measures yield the expected negative signs as in chapter two, suggesting that the farther
apart countries are ranked according to their risk rating, the less they trade. The final measure
“correlation” captures the correlation coefficient between the estimates of trade from each model
in and the observed trade flows. It is observed as was reported in chapter two that the models with
risk factors match the observed trade flows more than the model with just distance. As a result of
the correlations, I select the model with the highest correlation coefficient (model from column 3)
to use in instrumenting trade flows in stage two. The model from column 1 is used as the standard
with which I compare the effect of trade on growth when I introduce risk.

56

It is important to note that with measure of risk used in this study, the higher the rating the lower the risk of the
country. Therefore, a positive slope implies that the safer a country, the more it trades.
57

relriskt 

xriskt
and abrisk  xrisk  prisk
priskt
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Table 20: Estimating Trade Flow Instruments using the gravity model
Variable
Ln Distance

(1)
-0.853***
(0.000)

(2)
-0.852***
(0.000)

(3)
-0.860***
(0.000)

Ln Trade
(4)
-0.860***
(0.000)

(5)
-0.861***
(0.000)

(6)
-0.859***
(0.000)

Ln Population
(partner j)

1.365***
(0.000)

1.316***
(0.000)

1.161***
(0.000)

1.159***
(0.000)

1.205***
(0.000)

1.161***
(0.000)

Ln Population
(Country i)

1.553***
(0.000)

1.524***
(0.000)

1.409***
(0.000)

1.408***
(0.000)

1.407***
(0.000)

1.408***
(0.000)

Ln Area
(Country i)
Ln Area
(Partner j)

-0.566***
(0.000)
-0.640***
(0.000)

-0.511***
(0.000)
-0.586***
(0.000)

-0.430***
(0.000)
-0.488***
(0.000)

-0.430***
(0.000)
-0.487***
(0.000)

-0.477***
(0.000)
-0.519***
(0.000)

-0.431***
(0.000)
-0.488***
(0.000)

Country i
Risk

0.00816***
(0.000)

0.0105***
(0.000)

0.0106***
(0.000)

Partner j
Risk

0.00341***
(0.000)

0.00460***
(0.000)

0.00446***
(0.000)

0.00425***
(0.000)

0.00460***
(0.000)

0.000683
(0.188)

0.000288
(0.586)

0.000980*
(0.058)

0.000688
(0.184)

Lag Growth
Partner j

0.0105***
(0.000)

-0.00114*
(0.077)

Relrisk

-0.000876**
(0.038)

Abrisk

-9.175***
-9.761***
-7.560***
-7.527***
-6.793***
-7.528***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Correlation
0.3659
0.3917
0.4118
0.4121
0.3830
0.4116
N
259528
257641
231473
231242
232158
231473
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equations 60 using random effects estimation procedure
The full of variables including the indicator variables are included but not reported
“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings
Correlation indicates the correlation between the estimated trade flows in each model.
N is the number of data points used in each column.
_cons
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Table 21: Estimating Trade flows and accounting for risk mitigation

Ln Distance
Country i
Risk
Partner j
Risk
Lag Growth
Partner j
Abrisk
DCP
country i
DCP
Partner j
LL
country i
LL
Partner j
PPD
country i
PPD
Partner j
PPDF
country i
PPDF
Partner j
_cons

(7)
-0.867***
(0.000)
0.00908***
(0.000)
0.00264***
(0.000)
0.00293***
(0.000)
-0.000720*
(0.095)
0.00934***
(0.000)
0.00893***
(0.000)

Ln Trade
(8)
(9)
-0.863***
-0.825***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.0116***
0.0115***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.00390***
0.00369***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.00405***
0.00419***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.00171***
-0.00147***
(0.000)
(0.001)

(10)
-0.853***
(0.000)
0.0114***
(0.000)
0.00373***
(0.000)
0.00454***
(0.000)
-0.00131***
(0.004)

0.0117***
(0.000)
0.00906***
(0.000)
0.00942***
(0.000)
0.00822***
(0.000)

0.00906***
(0.000)
0.00819***
(0.000)
-4.223***
-4.949***
-4.968***
-4.374***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Correlation
0.4995
0.4909
0.4986
0.502
N
201189
192000
186497
187694
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table shows estimates of variations of
equations 60 using random effects estimation procedure. All variables from equation 60 are included in the
regression but only relevant variables are reported.“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the
absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings. DCP is domestic credit to the private sector, LL is liquid
liabilities, PPD is private credit by domestic money banks and PPDF is private credit by domestic money banks and
other financial institutions. Correlation indicates the correlation between the estimated trade flows in each model
and N is the number of data points used in each column

With the introduction of risk, I will be remiss if I did not consider certain aspects of the economy
that have been put in place to mitigate risk. Since to the best of my knowledge there are currently
no credit-markets designed to deal with the potential issues of the type of shocks I am suggesting,
I turn to the financial markets for a possible solution at least, to combat price fluctuations as
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discussed earlier58. As a result, I use the level of financial depth as a proxy for risk mitigation. The
idea is that countries with a higher level of financial depth are more likely to come up with
instruments that can eliminate at least some of the risk associated with trade59. Table 2 above
introduces 4 measures of financial depth in order to estimate which one leads to the best instrument
for trade flows. These measures are domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
(DCP), liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP (LL), private credit by domestic money banks as
a percentage of GDP (PPD) and finally, private credit by domestic money banks and other financial
institutions as a percentage of GDP (PPDF). All measures of financial depth yield positive and
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that the higher the level of financial depth in the
country, the higher the trade flows. The correlations between the measures of trade generated by
the addition of these new measures are higher than the measures with just risk alone, suggesting a
better match with the observed trade flows. As a result, the estimates from model 10 (column 4 in
table 2 above) is chosen as the third instrument of trade accounting for risk mitigation, for analysis
in stage 2.
3.3.3.2 Stage 2 Results
In this stage, using the three selected estimates of trade flows from stage 1 as instruments for trade,
I examine the true nature of the impact of trade on growth. In addition to the correlations however,
I perform the Stock, Wright, and Yogo. (2002) test to determine instrument strength and obtain the
following results60

58

While this is not expressed in the theoretical justification, the data will no doubt reflect risk owing to price and
currency fluctuations and the introduction of financial depth measures will suppress some of this risk.
59
An example of this would be the introduction of derivatives designed to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations.
60
Initial tests of endogeneity confirm that trade is in fact endogenous to growth as hypothesized earlier.
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Table 22: Instrument variable strength test
Instrument

R-squared

Adjusted R-squared

F-Statistic

P value

Model 1 (distance only)

0.02

0.01

1.503

0.2204

Model 4 (distance & Risk)

0.02

0.02

8.582

0.003

Model 10 (distance, Risk and financial

0.03

0.02

18.576

0.000

depth)

Table 22 above suggests that while all three models have relatively low explanatory power for
trade flow determination61, the standard model for instrumenting trade flows using just distance
measures alone is not an appropriate instrument of trade. This is evidenced by the p value which
leads to a rejection of the alternate hypothesis that the coefficient from the regression of this
instrument on observed trade flows is significantly different from zero. Models 4 and 10 however
show a level of significance suggesting better explanatory power for trade flows with Model 10
passing the F-stat >10 condition suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo. 2002. These results back
up the earlier conclusions based on correlations that Model 10 does the best job explaining trade
flows, followed closely by Model 4.
The assumption is that the measure from stage one that best matches the observed trade flows will
provide the most accurate relationship between trade and growth. To test this, equation (64) is
estimated and table 23 below provides the estimates62. From table 23, I find the expected signs for
the change in population, area and savings rate, all of which suggest that an increase in either will
lead to an increase in the rate of growth. All instruments of trade flows show a positive and
statistically significant effect of trade on growth. Columns 1 and 2 use predicted trade flows from
stage 1 of my analysis based on models 1 and 4 corresponding to benchmark case with no risk

61

Which is to be expected as GDP, a major driving force of trade flows has been removed from the analysis due to
reverse causality concerns
62
We also account for the area of a country with the assumption that the larger the area the more room for
expansion, hence the higher the rate of growth.
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measure and the case and full measure of risk, respectively. Both models indicate strong positive
role of trade in growth but the inclusion of risk measures (model 4) performs better as indicated
by the higher coefficient size and significance. To bring in financial depth as indicator of risk
mitigation, predicted trade flows from model 10 of stage 1 are also included (column 5). However,
here I face small loss of observations due to more limited data. Therefore, to make the comparison
with models 1 and 4 meaningful, I re-estimate those models with the more limited data (columns
3 and 4). The results confirm the risk mitigating role of finance in addressing the adverse trade
effects on growth. This is seen by the smaller coefficient of trade when it is constructed by
including financial depth. Notice also that the same pattern is observed for models 1 and 4 as in
the previous case.
Table 23: Role of trade on growth
(1)
26.77***
(0.001)

(2)
26.94***
(0.001)

Growth
(3)
22.23***
(0.005)

(4)
22.36***
(0.005)

(5)
26.63***
(0.001)

Ln Area

0.241***
(0.000)

0.254***
(0.000)

0.198***
(0.004)

0.212***
(0.002)

0.193**
(0.011)

Savings
Rate

0.0471***
(0.000)

0.0491***
(0.000)

0.0526***
(0.000)

0.0544***
(0.000)

0.0517***
(0.000)

Ln Trade
Share (M1)

0.658***
(0.000)

Population
Growth

0.617***
(0.000)
0.781***
(0.000)

Ln Trade
Share (M4)

0.735***
(0.000)
0.549***
(0.000)

Ln Trade
Share (M10)
_cons
N

1.257
(0.131)
1515

1.376*
(0.098)
1515

1.685*
(0.054)
1408

1.780**
(0.041)
1408

1.882**
(0.043)
1408

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equations 64 using random effects estimation procedure with the inclusion of time fixed
effects for all columns
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the
first stage. N is the number of data points used in each column
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The coefficient alone is not enough to determine the contribution of trade to growth due to the fact
that different specifications yield different trade estimates. I will address this issue in section 3.3.4
by estimating the share of each trade instrument on growth over time.
3.3.3.3 Stage 2 Robustness Checks
3.3.3.3.1

Accounting for Institutions

One could argue that since the risk measure of a country is another measure of its institutional
quality, the added benefit observed so far is just a reflection of the contributions of institutional
quality to growth and not the trade connection, due to the correlation between general institutional
quality and the risk-infused trade measure. To address this, I carry out robustness checks that
control for other institutional measures namely level of corruption, rule of law and government
efficiency.
Table 24: Robustness checks for the effects of trade on growth (Institutional quality)

Population
Growth
Ln Area
Savings
Rate
Ln Trade
Share (M1)
Ln Trade
Share (M2)
Government
Efficiency
Corruption

(1)
26.10***
(0.001)
0.224***
(0.002)
0.0478***
(0.000)
0.615***
(0.000)

-0.00458
(0.537)

(2)
26.16***
(0.001)
0.234***
(0.001)
0.0498***
(0.000)
0.725***
(0.000)
-0.00512
(0.484)

Growth
(3)
(4)
26.63***
26.64***
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.231***
0.235***
(0.002)
(0.001)
0.0473***
0.0494***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.635***
(0.000)
0.735***
(0.000)

-0.00218
(0.773)

Rule of Law

(5)
25.82***
(0.001)
0.195***
(0.007)
0.0484***
(0.000)
0.557***
(0.000)

(6)
25.72***
(0.001)
0.200***
(0.006)
0.0504***
(0.000)
0.653***
(0.000)

-0.00394
(0.589)
-0.0107
(0.143)

-0.0122*
(0.082)

Constant
1.633
1.788*
1.453
1.723
2.177**
2.405**
N
(0.113)
(0.079)
(0.176)
(0.101)
(0.036)
(0.018)
1515
1515
1515
1515
1515
1515
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equation 64 using random effects estimation procedure (controlling for Institutions)
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the
first stage.
N is the number of data points used in each column
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The expectation is that the inclusion of other institutional variables will eliminate or at least,
significantly decrease the relationship between the growth rate and the instrument of trade with
risk measures (i.e. an elimination of the significance or a significant reduction of the coefficient).
Table 24 above shows the results of these robustness checks. I observe a fairly robust measure of
trade with a reduction coming from the inclusion of the rule of law measure of institution. The
reduced coefficient still statistically significant, is larger than that of the instrument with distance
alone, suggesting that the improved relationship due to the introduction of the risk measures is not
just a consequence of the effect of institutional quality on growth.
3.3.3.3.2

Accounting for Human Capital Accumulation

It has been well established that human capital development is essential to growth and productivity
(Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). Data on this factor however for the time period examined is not
as comprehensive, as the inclusion of measures of this variable reduce the sample size by half. In
order to generalize the conclusions in this study as much as possible, human capital accumulation
is not introduced in the main regression analysis, but the impact of human capital inclusion on the
effect of the trade share instruments on growth is estimated in this section, in order to determine if
the inclusion would significantly change the findings. I use three proxies for human capital
accumulation to test this: Government expenditure on tertiary institutions as a fraction of
government expenditure on education (GET), Government expenditure on Education in Total as a
fraction of total government expenditure (GEE) and net enrolment of secondary school students
as a fraction of the total population of children of secondary school age, (NE). Table 25 below
shows the results of this robustness check. From table 5, none of the measures of human capital
accumulation significantly alters the estimates of the effect of trade shares on growth rates. As a
result, I go ahead and estimate the contribution of these instruments of trade on growth over time,

117

using the results from estimations without human capital accumulation measures.
3.3.3.4 Estimating the contribution of trade to growth
Next, I estimate the contribution of the different trade instruments to growth over time. To do
this, I re-estimate equation (64) using the natural log of one plus trade share as opposed to the
natural log of trade share63. Each trade instrument is multiplied by its coefficient, and the ratio of
this multiple to growth is taken and averaged over all countries for each year. The variable
obtained is the contribution of the different instruments of trade shares to growth rates. Figure 18
below shows a plot of these contributions over time, comparing models 1 and 4 from stage one,
while figure 19 shows the plot over time comparing models 1, 4 and 10 from stage one64.
Figure 18

Figure 19

63

This simply makes the calculation of the share easier as adding one to the trade shares before taking logs creates
positive entries (as opposed to log of proper fractions which are negative). The results we obtain from the regression
analysis are not significantly different and can be found in table C-1 of the appendix to this chapter.
64
This is done to ensure accurate comparisons between measures due to the fact that data is unavailable for some
countries in some time periods. Figure one has 1515 observations while figure 2 has 1408 observations.
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Table 25: Robustness check for effects of trade on growth (Human capital Accumulation)
(1)
17.40
(0.217)

(2)
18.63
(0.188)

(3)
13.66
(0.327)

(4)
15.22
(0.274)

(5)
39.11***
(0.001)

Growth Rates
(6)
(7)
40.02***
18.21
(0.001)
(0.192)

(8)
19.62
(0.160)

(9)
14.82
(0.288)

(10)
16.45
(0.237)

(11)
40.61***
(0.000)

(12)
41.62***
(0.000)

Ln area

0.231***
(0.003)

0.221***
(0.005)

0.168**
(0.041)

0.172**
(0.035)

0.225***
(0.001)

0.226***
(0.001)

0.252***
(0.001)

0.240***
(0.002)

0.181**
(0.033)

0.184**
(0.030)

0.239***
(0.001)

0.239***
(0.001)

Savings
Rate

0.103***
(0.000)

0.104***
(0.000)

0.0847***
(0.000)

0.0844***
(0.000)

0.0738***
(0.000)

0.0708***
(0.000)

0.107***
(0.000)

0.108***
(0.000)

0.0870***
(0.000)

0.0868***
(0.000)

0.0767***
(0.000)

0.0740***
(0.000)

Ln Trade
Share (M1)

0.685***
(0.000)

0.669***
(0.000)

0.681***
(0.000)

0.689***
(0.000)

0.601***
(0.000)

0.640***
(0.000)
0.819***
(0.000)

0.801***
(0.000)

0.800***
(0.000)

0.808***
(0.000)

0.723***
(0.000)

0.766***
(0.000)

Population
Growth
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Ln Trade
Share (M2)

GET

GEE

NE

-0.0224
(0.291)

-0.0275
(0.190)
-0.0867**
(0.017)

-0.0860**
(0.019)
0.00973
(0.228)

0.00935
(0.242)

0.123
0.638
1.273
2.584**
-0.0878
-0.669
0.119
0.746
1.432
2.753**
0.0293
-0.518
(0.908)
(0.586)
(0.234)
(0.031)
(0.925)
(0.525)
(0.910)
(0.519)
(0.192)
(0.025)
(0.976)
(0.626)
N
742
742
875
875
752
752
742
742
870
870
743
743
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equations 64 using random effects estimation procedure
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the first stage. GET is Government expenditure
on tertiary institutions as a fraction of government expenditure on education, GEE is Government expenditure on Education in total as a fraction of total
government expenditure and NE is the net enrolment of secondary school students as a fraction of the total population of children of secondary school age. N is
the number of data points used in each column
_cons

Both figures show first and formost that the trade instrument with risk shows a higher level of
contribution to growth than the measure without, suggesting that the contribution of trade to
growth has been underestimated due to the fact that the trade instrument with risk, better matches
observed trade. Figure 19 however, shows that the inclusion of risk mitigating factors points to an
overestimation of the trade contribution to growth. The introduction of model 10 depicts a lower
contribution during the initial periods of the financial crisis when the very financial instruments
designed to mitigate these risks generated risks of their own, leading to distrust of these financial
instruments and as such, a decline in the contribution of trade to growth. But, as is observed from
2009, the return of trust to the financial system once again increases the share of trade in growth.
3.3.3.5 Addressing the role of trade in developing and developed countries
In chapter 2, it is suggested that fact that poorer countries tend to be riskier, the effect of trade on
growth may differ between developed and developed countries, as potential trading opportunities
between developed and developing countries might not happen due to the risky nature of the
developing countries. To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable is introduced and interacted with
the risk measure of country i. Using the Human Development Index (HDI), the dummy variable
takes a value of “0” if the country is ranked in the top 50 and a value of “1” if it is ranked below
50. In essence, I run the following regression
groit   0   1 ln popt   2 savit   3 ln tsit   4 Dev *ln tsit  it

(65)

Where “Dev” is the development level indicator described above and everything else is same as in
equation 64. Table 26 below captures the results of the regressions.
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Table 26: Role of trade on growth (Development-Trade instrument interaction)

(1)
22.74***
(0.003)

(2)
22.79***
(0.003)

Growth
(3)
(4)
***
27.25
23.24***
(0.001)
(0.002)

(5)
23.45***
(0.002)

(6)
27.08***
(0.000)

Ln of Area

0.286***
(0.000)

0.302***
(0.000)

0.309***
(0.000)

0.288***
(0.000)

0.293***
(0.000)

0.279***
(0.000)

Savings Rate

0.0426***
(0.000)

0.0438***
(0.000)

0.0402***
(0.000)

0.0437***
(0.000)

0.0455***
(0.000)

0.0440***
(0.000)

Ln of trade share
M1

0.602***
(0.000)

Population
Growth

0.726***
(0.000)
0.685***
(0.000)

Ln of trade share
M4

0.837***
(0.000)
0.525***
(0.000)

Ln of trade share
M10

0.731***
(0.000)
-0.365***
(0.008)

Dev*Ln of trade
share M1

-0.407***
(0.003)

Dev*Ln of trade
share M4

-0.485***
(0.001)

Dev*Ln of trade
share M10
_cons
N

0.796
(0.363)
1397

0.814
(0.352)
1397

0.719
(0.439)
1397

0.727
(0.392)
1397

0.818
(0.331)
1397

0.803
(0.362)
1397

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equation 65 using random effects estimation procedure
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the
first stage. Dev is the indicator variable with 0 for countries ranked in the top 50 according to the Human
development index and 1 for those ranked below 50. N is the number of data points used in each column
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Columns 1, 2 and 3 in table 26 above serve as bench marks with which to compare the introduction
of the interaction term. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the regression results with the interaction term
included. The most obvious observation is that all models carry a negative sign when the
interaction term is introduced. This implies that

 2 growth
  growth 

0
DevLntrade Dev  Lntrade 
Suggesting that the closer to one the dummy variable “DEV” (meaning the less developed), the
lower the impact of trade on growth. This indicates that the developing countries benefit less from
trade than their developing counterparts. Furthermore, comparing models 1 and 4 in columns 4
and 5 of Table 26, it is observed that the absolute value of the coefficient of the interaction term
increases as we introduce risk. This is an indicator that the risky nature of developing countries
contributes to the reduced effect of trade on growth, providing evidence in support of the
hypothesis that risk impacts trade more negatively in developing countries than in developed
countries. The same trend is observed when financial depth is introduced in column 6, as it is well
established that developing countries tend to have lower financial depth and hence, cannot provide
sufficient hedging against risk as is the case for their developed counterparts. This also suggests
that the effect of trade on growth diminishes with the level of development.
3.3.3.6 Addressing the role of imports and exports respectively on trade.
Finally, as was highlighted in earlier sections in this chapter, trade has been shown to be beneficial
to growth rate of an economy, however it is still unclear what portion of this is due to export or
imports. In this subsection, I disaggregate trade into its components (exports and imports) and
repeat stages one and two above for each, in order to highlight the contribution of exports and
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imports respectively to growth. Tables C-2 and C-3 in the appendix capture the stage one results
which are used to generate instruments for exports and imports, while table C-4 in the appendix
captures the stage two results of the impact of imports and exports on growth. Figures 20 and 21
below show the differences in export and import contributions when considering distance alone
and when risk is introduced. The same misspecification is observed in both figures similar to those
in the total trade graphs above.
Figure 20: Import contribution to growth

Figure 21: Export contribution to growth
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Figures 22 and 23 below highlight the contribution of each component of trade as well as the total
trade contriubution wth each model specification respectively. We find that in both model
specifications, trade contributions are driven primarily by imports, as declines and increases in
import contribution to growth are mirrored by the total trade contribution to growth, with exports
contribution being relatively smooth over time, with the exception of the financial crisis. It is also
observed in light with earlier findings, that the introduction of risk measures, imply that the
contribution of trade to growth has been underestimated.
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Figure 22: Import and Export contribution to growth (Without Risk)
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Figure 23: Import and Export contribution to growth (Without Risk)
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I set out to determine the effect of the introduction of exogenous measures of risk in
trade flows on the role of trade in growth. This is first theoretically estimated and it is observed
that the determinants of trade flow impact the rate of growth. Focusing primarily of distance (as a
proxy for transportation costs) and risks form supply and demand shocks (proxied by the measures
of political stability and the presence of terrorist attacks and growth rates of partner countries in
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the empirical analysis), I find that an increase in risk or distance measures negatively impacts the
growth rates of economies. Furthermore, this effect is tested empirically by comparing the effect
of two intrusments for trade flows (one with risk measures and one without) on growth rates. I
find, in line with the results of the theoretical study, that the both measures yield significantly
different responses to growth with the contribution of the instrument with risk to growth being
significantly larger than the instrument without. With the instrument containing risk being the most
correlated with observed trade flows, I conclude that previous empirical estimates of the role of
trade in growth have been underestimated. I however findcause for caution upon introducing
measures for risk mitigation (proxied by measures of financial depth). The inclusion of these
measures give rise to instruments that match observed trade flows even more closely than just risk
measures alone, and sometimes show a smaller (or larger) role for trade in growth than estimated
by the instrument with risk measures and the instrument with just distance. This points to the partial
elimination of price related risk in a financially developed environment that could potentially
hinder trade and the effect of the collapse of the global financial system during the geat recession
of 2008. This finding of the relevance of risk in detremining trade flows and subsequently growth
is important as it ties directly to potential growth enhancing policies geared towards developing
countries that have been suggested in the past. Suggestions like a focus on outward oriented trade
policies designed to encourage domestic producers to export and therefore drive growth are
doomed to fail, all else equal, if it is not supplemented by policies that improve macroeconomic
stability. Finally, the popular notion that trade between developed and developing countries can
be stimulated if there is a reduction in both tariff and non tariff barriers in the developed countries
will also prove ineffective, and would only serve to increase trade between develpoed countries
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and as a result, will have little effect on the devloping economies if not accompanied by these
policies to ensure stability.
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Appendix 3.1

1. Aggregating the cost function
1  d1  1  d2  1  d3  ...  1   d N M





N M   d1  d2  ...  d NM  N M    D M   C  D M 

2. Explaining aggregation of expected capital
Consider the set of real numbers  which is a field satisfying the following axioms
1. Closure: if a and b   then a  b and a.b  
1
2. Existence of inverse under multiplication and addition: If a  , then and  a  
a
(There are other axioms such as associativity, commutativity and identity, but I do not
need these for the following proof)
0  i  1 , di  0  and mi  0  
NM

d

Then by axiom 1 above, i mi 1   di   ,
NM

 m 1   d   and C  D   since

N M , ,  (by axiom 2,   )

M

i 1

i

i

i 1

 D M  by the same axiom,

i

i

N

Also, by axiom 1,

 m 
i 1

i

By axiom 2,  ,    such that  

1

, 

N

m
i 1

i

1
C  DM 

N

N

Therefore by axiom 1,  i mi 1   di  

 m 1   d 

i 1

i

C D

i

i

m
N

M

i 1

 . As a result, 

i

 m 1  d   C  D   m
N

such that

i 1

N

M

i 1

i

i

i

By definition, 0    1 because

i 1

i

NM

NM

i 1

i 1

i mi   mi (due to the fact that 0  i  1 )

NM

M t  i mi 1   di   C  D M  mt
i 1
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NM

Where mt =

m
i 1

i

3. The full specification of the Lagrangian with alternative Bellman specification following

L  max
D

ct , kt 1 , xt 1




t 0

t

u c     f  k
t

D
t

t



, M t   ct  ktD1  ktD  X t 1 

L
 0   t u '  ct   t  0
ct

(A.1)

L
 0  t  t  t 1 t 1  f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1  0
D
kt 1

(A.2)

M t
X t 1
L
 0  t  t f 2  ktD , M t 
 t  t
0
xt 1
xt 1
xt 1

(A.3)





(A.2) resolves to t  t 1  f1 ktD1 , M t 1  1
(A.4) (equation 16 in paper)
(A.3) resolves to f 2  ktD , M t

 M
x



t

t 1

X t 1
xt 1

 f 2  k , M t  t  R  t  R  C  D M  C  D X   t  R  C  D X 
D
t

 1  f 2  ktD , M t  t  R  C  D M 
(equation 17 in paper)
From 4 Euler equation is given as

(A.5)
u '  ct 
   f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1
u '  ct 1 

(A.6)

Alternatively, the infinite horizon problem can be rewritten as a Bellman equation
(principle of optimality) and the solution of the function that satisfies the following
equation also solves the infinite sequence problem
V  ktD   max u  ct   V  ktD1 

(A.7)

The state variable is ktD while the choice or control variables are ct , ktD1 and xt 1

 

Subject to ktD1  f  ktD , M t   ct  ktD  X t 1 ; X t  t  R  xt C D X and
M t  t  R  t  R  C  D M  C  D X  xt 1

First order conditions
With respect to choice variables
ct : u '  ct   V '  ktD1   0

(A.8)
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xt 1 : f 2  ktD , M t

 M
x

t



t 1

X t 1
0
xt 1

With respect to the State variable

 
From (A.8) u '  c   V '  k 

(A.9)

  



Envelope Theorem: V ' ktD  V ' ktD1  f1 ktD , M t  1

(A.10)

D
t 1

t

From (A.9) V '  k

D
t 1

 

From (A.11) and (A.12)

(A.11)

V '  ktD 

(A.12)

D

 f1  kt , M t   1

V '  ktD 

 f1  ktD , M t   1



(A.13) therefore implies that

 u '  ct 

V '  ktD1 

 f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1



 V '  ktD1   u '  ct 1   f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1

(A.13)

 u '  ct 1 

(A.14)
(A.15)





(A.11) and (A.15) imply that u '  ct    u '  ct 1   f1 ktD1 , M t 1  1
u '  ct 
Therefore the Euler equation =
   f1  ktD1 , M t 1   1
u '  ct 1 
(same as A.6 above). Equation (A.9) also resolves to equation (A.5) above.
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(A.16)
(A.17)

Appendix 3.2
Table C-1: Re-estimation of equation 63 with Ln (1+trade share)
(1)
26.86***
(0.001)

(2)
26.20***
(0.001)

Growth
(3)
22.85***
(0.005)

(4)
22.19***
(0.006)

(5)
25.87***
(0.002)

Ln area

0.203***
(0.004)

0.208***
(0.003)

0.157**
(0.032)

0.162**
(0.027)

0.160**
(0.035)

Savings
Rate

0.0405***
(0.000)

0.0430***
(0.000)

0.0468***
(0.000)

0.0492***
(0.000)

0.0484***
(0.000)

Trade
share
Model 1

1.625***

1.462***

(0.000)

(0.000)

Population
Growth

Trade
share
Model 4

2.339***
(0.000)

2.127***
(0.000)

Trade
share
Model 10
cons
N

0.142
(0.875)
1515

-0.0394
(0.966)
1515

0.720
(0.447)
1408

0.547
(0.567)
1408

2.217***
(0.002)
0.796
(0.427)
1408

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equation 64 using random effects estimation procedure with the inclusion of time fixed
effects for all columns
Trade share (Model i) is the log of one plus estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the
first stage.
N is the number of data points used in each column
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Table C-2: Generating Instruments for Exports

(1)
-1.5***

(2)
-1.5***

Ln Exports
(3)
-1.464***

Ln Population
(partner j)

1.4***

1.356***

1.293***

1.292***

1.091***

Ln Population
(Country i)
Ln Area
(Country i)
Ln Area
(Partner j)

1.6***

1.648***

1.621***

1.621***

1.432***

-0.5***

-0.431***

-0.389***

-0.389***

-0.233***

-0.5***

-0.415***

-0.362***

-0.362***

-0.211***

Country i
Risk

0.0178***

0.0218***

0.0220***

0.0197***

Partner j
Risk

0.0110***

0.0126***

0.0123***

0.00995***

0.00194***

0.00166***

0.00516***

-0.00241***

-0.00126**

Ln Distance

Lag Growth
Partner j
Relrisk

(4)
-1.464***

(5)
-1.469***

DCP
country i

0.0121***

DCP
Partner j

0.0106***

_cons
N

-10.0***
230087

-12.97***
228515

-12.80***
207073

-12.76***
206914

-11.17***
180640

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table shows estimates of
variations of equation 60 using random effects estimation procedure. All variables from equation 60 are
included in the regression but only relevant variables are reported.“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks
and “DCP is domestic credit to the private sector, and N is the number of data points used in each column
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Table C-3: Generating Instruments for Imports

Ln Imports
(3)
(4)
-0.0348
-0.0351
(0.340)
(0.336)

(1)
-0.0217
(0.555)

(2)
-0.0172
(0.642)

Ln Population 0.856***
(partner j)
(0.000)

0.855***
(0.000)

0.683***
(0.000)

0.681***
(0.000)

0.397***
(0.000)

Ln Population 1.057***
(Country i)
(0.000)
Ln Area
(Country i)
-0.433***
Ln Area
(0.000)
(Partner j)
Ln Distance
-0.513***
(0.000)

1.065***
(0.000)

0.919***
(0.000)

0.917***
(0.000)

0.675***
(0.000)

-0.425***
(0.000)

-0.332***
(0.000)

-0.331***
(0.000)

-0.179***
(0.000)

-0.507***
(0.000)

-0.404***
(0.000)

-0.403***
(0.000)

-0.219***
(0.000)

Country i
Risk

0.00326***
(0.000)

0.00433***
(0.000)

0.00439***
(0.000)

0.00455***
(0.000)

Partner j
Risk

-0.0000835 0.000576
(0.878)
(0.320)

0.000485
(0.406)

-0.000270
(0.671)

0.000143
(0.808)

-0.000314
(0.602)

0.00201***
(0.003)

-0.000698
(0.345)

-0.000108
(0.909)

Ln Distance

Lag Growth
Partner j
Relrisk

(5)
-0.00139
(0.970)

PPD
country i

0.00804***
(0.000)

PPD
Partner j

0.00670***
(0.000)

_cons
N

-4.982***
(0.000)
236312

-5.452***
(0.000)
234197

-2.529***
(0.000)
210414

-2.494***
(0.000)
210183

0.990*
(0.062)
166353

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table shows estimates of
variations of equations 60 using random effects estimation procedure. All variables from equation 60 are
included in the regression but only relevant variables are reported.“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks
and “PPD” is private credit by domestic money banks and, and N is the number of data points used in each
column
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Table C-4: Establishing the role of Exports and Imports individually on growth

Population Growth
Ln of area
Savings Rate
Ln of Import share
(Without risk)
Ln of Export share
(Without Risk)
Ln of Import share
(With risk)

Growth
(2)
(3)
20.90***
24.59***
(0.010)
(0.003)
***
0.275
0.171**
(0.000)
(0.025)
0.0584***
0.0453***
(0.000)
(0.000)

(1)
20.54**
(0.011)
0.259***
(0.001)
0.0573***
(0.000)
0.421***
(0.008)

(4)
24.15***
(0.003)
0.190**
(0.014)
0.0479***
(0.000)

0.267**
(0.021)
0.494***
(0.000)
0.312***
(0.006)

Ln of Export share
(With Risk)
Ln of 1+Import share
(Without risk)

11.15*
(0.067)

(Ln of 1+Import share)^2
(Without risk)

-33.78**
(0.015)

Ln of Export share
(Without Risk)

1.355***
(0.000)
19.97**
(0.017)

Ln of 1+Import share
(With risk)
(Ln of 1+Import share)^2
(With risk)

-70.90***
(0.009)

Ln of Export share
(With Risk)

1.877***
(0.000)

_cons
N

2.396***
(0.007)
1408

2.668***
(0.003)
1408

0.563
(0.585)
1408

0.136
(0.897)
1408

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
Estimating variations of equations 64 using random effects estimation procedure with the inclusion of time
fixed effects for all columns
Ln Export(Import) share is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from
the models with and without risk in the first stage. N is the number of data points used in each column
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Table C-5: Table of Variable sources and descriptions
Variable
Bilateral
Exports &
Imports
Distance

Description
Value of total exports from
a country to each trading
partner
Arial distance between
trading pairs

GDP/Growth
rates

Gross Domestic Product of
each Country/change in
GDP for each country

Population

Number of people in each
country

Area

Surface area is a country's
total area, including areas
under inland bodies of water
and some coastal waterways

Risk Measure

Political stability of the
Governments
and
the
presence of terrorism in
each country

Common
language

Contiguous

Col45

Comcol

Curcol

colony

Source
International Monetary Fund Database.
data.imf.org
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators
French Research Center in International Economics
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8

0 if no common language
and 1 if both countries in a
pair speak the same
language
1 if both countries share a French Research Center in International Economics
border and 0 if they do not
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8
1 if both countries have had French Research Center in International Economics
a colonial relationship after http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
1945 and 0 if they do night asp?id=8
1 if both countries have French Research Center in International Economics
been colonized by the same http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
country and 0 if they do not. asp?id=8
1 if trading partners are French Research Center in International Economics
currently in a colonial http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
relationship 0 otherwise
asp?id=8
1 if one country in a pair French Research Center in International Economics
was colonized by the other, http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
and 0 otherwise
asp?id=8
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Table C.4 (cont.)
Variable
Rule of Law

Corruption

Government
effectiveness

Savings rate

DCP

LL

PPD

Description
Rule
of
Law captures
perceptions of the extent to
which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the
quality
of
contract
enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime
and violence
Control of Corruption captures
perceptions of the extent to
which public power is
exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as
"capture" of the state by elites
and private interests
Government
Effectiveness
captures perceptions of the
quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the
credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies

Source
World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators

World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators

World Bank World Governance Indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governanceindicators

Gross savings (% of GNI)

World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
Domestic credit to private World Bank World development indicators
sector (% of GDP)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
Liquid liabilities to GDP World Bank World development indicators
(%)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
Private credit by deposit World Bank World development indicators
money banks to GDP (%)
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
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Table C-4 (cont.)
Variable
PPDF

NE

GEE

GET

Description
Private credit by deposit
money banks and other
financial institutions to
GDP (%)

Source
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
World Bank World development indicators
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators

Net enrollment rate is the
ratio of children of official
school age who are enrolled
in school to the population
of
the
corresponding
official school age
Expenditure on education as World Bank World development indicators
% of total government http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
expenditure
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
Expenditure on tertiary as % World Bank World development indicators
of government expenditure http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
on education (%)
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators
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